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I. INTRODUCTION
This article offers a critical reading of the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") December 23, 2010 Report and
Order entitled "Preserving the Open Internet."I This year-long proceeding,
concluded just as the 2010 lame duck Congress was about to adjourn, resulted
in significant new regulations for some broadband Internet access providers.
The new rules enact into law a version of what is sometimes referred to as
the "net neutrality" principle. Proponents of net neutrality regulation argue that
the Internet's defining feature-and the key to its unarguable success-is the
content-neutral routing and transport of individual packets through the network
by Internet service providers, a feature of the network that requires strong
2protection and enforcement by the FCC. The FCC describes its new rules as
rules of the road to ensure a "level playing field" for application and other
service providers in accessing U.S. markets, consumers, and devices.3
t Larry Downes is Senior Adjunct Fellow with TechFreedom. His books include LARRY
DOWNES, UNLEASHING THE KILLER APP: DIGITAL STRATEGIES FOR MARKET DOMINANCE
(Harvard Business School Press 1998) and, most recently, LARRY DOWNES, THE LAWS OF
DISRUPTION: HARNESSING THE NEW FORCES THAT GOVERN LIFE AND BUSINESS IN THE
DIGITAL AGE (Basic Books 2009). This article was adapted from testimony delivered on
February 15, 2011, before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property, Competition, and Internet. Ensuring Competition on the Internet: Net Neutrality
andAntitrust Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Larry
Downes, Senior Adjunct Fellow, TechFreedom). The author thanks Berin Szoka and Adam
Marcus for helpful comments and corrections on an earlier draft.
In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, 25
F.C.C.R. 17905 (Dec. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Open Internet Order].
2 See Kim Hart and Sara Kehaulani Goo, Tech Faceoff Net Neutrality in the Eye of the
Beholder, WASH. POST (July 2, 2006), http://commcns.org/sV1fjD.
See Tim Wu, Net Neutrality FAQ, http://commcns.org/rOeb2M (last visited Oct. 7,
2011). Wu is generally regarded as having coined the term "net neutrality," which does not,
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Yet many who share the enthusiasm of all five Commissioners for the Open
Internet -and not just the three Commissioners who voted to approve the new
regulations-were troubled by the politics of the proceeding and the scope of
the resulting Order.4 The Open Internet rulemaking dominated the agency's
agenda for the first year of Chairman Julius Genachowski's term, pushing
higher priority issues, including a looming mobile broadband spectrum crisis
and reform of the archaic Universal Service Fund, to the backburner.5
6Approval for Comcast's merger with NBC Universal was repeatedly delayed.
In the controversy spawned by the net neutrality proceeding, the agency's
visionary National Broadband Plan was largely forgotten.7
In the end, the agency failed to produce any evidence of a need for
regulatory intervention to "preserve" this robust ecosystem. Nor could it
overcome a chorus of criticism from Congress and legal academics, who
continued to remind the FCC that it had no authority from Congress to manage
engineering practices of broadband access providers. The likelihood is very
high that legal challenges will result in a ruling that the rulemaking was
beyond the agency's limited jurisdiction. 9
As with any lawmaking involving disruptive technologies, moreover, the
risk of unintended consequences is high.' 0 In its haste to pass rules before the
however, appear in the text of the Open Internet Order. The FCC prefers the term "Open
Internet." Chloe Albanesius, What Do the FCC's Net Neutrality Rules Mean For You?,
PCMAG (Dec. 22, 2010), http://commcns.org/veUgEM.
4 See Grant Gross, Net Neutrality Rules Aren't Strong Enough for Broadband, IDG NEWS
SERVICE (Oct. 3, 2011), http://commcns.org/voTTyW; Tina Nguyen, Liberal Group
Challenges FCC Net Neutrality Ruling, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 28. 2011),
http://commcns.org/rYqP 10.
See Larry Downes, Spectrum Worries at CES: Dekd Vu All Over Again, CNET NEWS
(Jan. 8, 2011), http://commcns.org/sTT9Vm; Larry Downes, Is Net Neutrality Blocking
FCC Spectrum Auctions?, CNET NEWS (July 29, 2011), http://commcns.org/sbi5zC; Sara
Jerome, End of the Julius Genachowski Era May Come Soon at the FCC, THE HILL (Mar. 9,
2011), http://commcns.org/vEnnEj.
6 See In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC
Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses or Transfer Control of Licensees, Order, 25
F.C.C.R. 3802 (Apr. 16, 2010); Commission Announces Revised Pleading Schedule for its
Review of Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC
Universal, Inc., to Assign and Transfer Control of FCC Licenses, Public Notice, 25 F.C.C.R.
4407 (May 5, 2010); In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company
and NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses or Transfer Control of Licensees,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 4238 (Jan. 18, 2011).
Chloe Albanesius, FCC National Broadband Plan One Year Later: Where Are We
Now?, PCMAG (Mar. 17, 2011), http:/http://commcns.org/rKCQJV; Transcript: FCC Chief
On Defensive Over Stalled Broadband Plan, NPR (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://commcns.org/tOWaGR.
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011).
9 See Larry Downes, Net Neutrality: The Fight Goes On, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://commcns.org/skmDfp.
o See Larry Downes, The Laws of Disruption: Harnessing the New Forces that Govern
84 [Vol. 20
Unscrambling the FCC's Net Neutrality Order
opening of a new Congress with a Republican-controlled House, the
Commission's Democratic majority interfered with the continued evolution of
this vital technology.
This article dissects several key aspects of the Open Internet Order,
including the evolution of what the agency terms its "prophylactic" rules, the
perceived market failures that led the agency to issue them, and a number of
approved exceptions, caveats, and exemptions that reveal a fundamental
misunderstanding by the agency of the meaning of "the Open Internet" in the
first place. Additionally, it includes a discussion of the largely unexamined
costs of enforcing the rules, as well as the most significant holes in the
agency's legal justification for issuing them.
II. BACKGROUND
The FCC published the Open Internet Order at the last possible moment
before the 2010 Christmas holiday, capping off years of debate on the subject
of whether or not the agency needed to step in to save the Internet.'' The end
of the process was as controversial as the start-only Chairman Genachowski
fully supported the Order. His two Democratic colleagues concurred in the
vote (one approved in part and concurred in part) and issued separate opinions
indicating their belief that stronger measures and a sounder legal foundation
were required to withstand likely court challenges.12 The two Republican
Commissioners vigorously dissented in strident terms unusual in this kind of
regulatory action.13
How did the FCC arrive at this unsatisfactory conclusion? In October 2009,
the agency first proposed the new rules, but their efforts were upended by an
April 2010 court decision that held the agency lacked authority to regulate
broadband Internet access providers.14 After flirting with the dangerous idea of
"reclassifying" broadband to bring it under the old rules reserved for what's
left of traditional telephone service ("Title II"), the Chairman backed away.
Speaking to state regulators in mid-November, the Chairman made no mention
of net neutrality or reclassification, saying only that "At the FCC, our primary
Life and Business in the Digital Age 18-19 (Basic Books 2009).
1 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Ten Things that Finally Killed Net Neutrality, CNET
NEWS (Sept. 6, 2007), http://commcns.org/tgZDtF.
12 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 18044-48 (Copps, Comm'r, concurring); id. at
18082-83 (Clyburn, Comm'r, approving in part, concurring in part).13 Id at 18049 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 18084 (Baker, Comm'r,
dissenting).
14 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
15 In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 7866,
7867 (June 17, 2010).
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focus is simple: the economy and jobs."16
Just a few days later, however, at the Web 2.0 Summit in San Francisco, the
Chairman promised that net neutrality rules would be finalized after all, and
soon. The reaction was frenzied. From then until the Commission's final
meeting of the year, Commissioners and agency watchers lobbied hard and
voiced outrage with changing drafts of the rules, whose contents were not
entirely clear.' In oral comments delivered at the December meeting, two
Commissioners complained that they had not seen the version they were to
vote on until midnight the night before the vote.19 Moreover, journalists
covering the event did not have the document all five Commissioners
referenced repeatedly in their spoken comments, and had to wait two more
days for all the separate opinions to be collated and published.2
This attempt to rush the Open Internet Order out the door was likely related
to a change in congressional composition, though indirectly. Since FCC
Commissioners do not serve at the whim of Congress or the President, the
2010 mid-term election results technically had no effect on the agency; even
with a Republican House, successful legislation to block or overturn FCC
actions is unlikely. But passing some version of Open Internet rules as
Congress was nearly adjourned, in the end, was perhaps the best chance the
Chairman had for getting these new rules into the Federal Register. It also
enabled the FCC to divert political pressure elsewhere. Tired of the rancor and
distraction of net neutrality, the new rules-incomplete, awkward, and without
a solid legal foundation-move the issue from the offices of the FCC to the
courts and Congress.
Even before the Order was published in the Federal Register, Verizon and
MetroPCS challenged its validity in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.21 However, since the Order was deemed "a rulemaking document
subject to publication in the Federal Register, and is not a licensing decision
16 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Our Information Infrastructure: Opportunities
and Challenges, Prepared Remarks at NARUC Annual Meeting at 1 (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://commcns.org/s4Fe3i.
Sara Jerome, FCC Chairman Genachowski Knocks Google, Verizon for Slowing Net-
Neutrality Efforts, THE HILL (Nov. 17, 2010), http://commcns.org/vxpclY.
18 Ryan Singel, FCC Net Neutrality Rules Slammed from All Sides, WIRED (Dec. 20,
2010), http://commcns.org/unlHHo; Joel Rose, Critics: 'Net Neutrality' Rules Full of
Loopholes, NPR (Dec. 22, 2010), http://commcns.org/trulhU.I See Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 18049-50 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
20 See Amy Gahran, Why Is FCC's 'Net Neutrality' Order Still a Secret?, CNN TECH
(Dec. 21, 2010), http://commcns.org/u77GHP; Stacey Higginbotham, FCC's New Net
Neutrality Compromise Is Better, GIGAOM (Dec. 20, 2010), http://commcns.org/rrjxyX.
21 See Marguerite Reardon, Verizon Fires Legal Shot Against Net Neutrality Rules, CNET
NEWS (Jan. 20, 2011), http://commcns.org/u2p3sp; Marguerite Reardon, FCC Moves to
Dismiss Net Neutrality Lawsuits, CNET NEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://commcns.org/rZ9hBK.
86 [Vol. 20
Unscrambling the FCC's Net Neutrality Order
'with respect to specific parties,"' the suits were dismissed. 22
After months of review by both the FCC and OMB, the Order was finally
published in the Federal Register on September 23, 2011, leading to a new
flood of legal challenges. 23 Verizon again filed its petition for review in the
D.C. Circuit, while public interest groups filed petitions in five different U.S.
circuit courts of appeals in an attempt to remove the case from the D.C.
Circuit, the court that had ruled against the FCC in the 2010 Comcast case.24
Ultimately, a lottery conducted by the Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
determined that the D.C. Circuit would hear the consolidated petitions.25
Shortly after the Commission passed the Order, Congress began its new
term by pursuing two avenues for overturning the rules and limiting the FCC's
ability to enact future Internet regulations. First, Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-
TN), introduced legislation in the opening days of Congress to prohibit the
agency from regulating the Internet in any way.26 Second, under the
Congressional Review Act, Congress attempted to undo the agency action
through a joint Resolution of Disapproval, a filibuster-proof measure.27 In
April 2011, most House Republicans and some Democrats passed the
28Resolution, which would nullify the rules. However, the pending Resolution
required Democratic support in the Senate and faced a promised Presidential
veto. 29
In the end, the Resolution failed in the Senate.30 Even so, Republicans have
22 Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1014,2011 WL 1235523, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2011) ("The
order will therefore be subject to judicial review upon publication in the Federal Register...
. [he prematurity is incurable.").
Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,192 (Sept. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 0 and 8).
24 See Petitions for Review of the Federal Communications Commission's In re
Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices; WC
Docket No. 07-52, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010), Notice of Multicircuit
Petitions for Review, attach. A (Oct. 5, 2011) (Free Press, People's Production House,
Media Mobilizing Project, Mountain Area Information Network, and Access Humboldt filed
suits in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, respectively).
25 In Re: Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Preserving the Open
Internet, Report and Order, FCC 10-201, 76 Fed. Reg. 59192 (2011), Published on
September 23, 2011, Consolidation Order, I (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Oct.
6, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/sOFyyT.
26 See Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 96, 112th Cong. (2011). Specifically, the bill would
prevent the FCC from "propos[ing], promulgat[ing], or issu[ing] any regulations regarding
the Internet or IP-enabled services."
27 See 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2006).
28 H.R.J. RES. 37, 112th Cong. (as passed by the House and placed on the Senate
Calendar, April 13, 2011).29 See Larry Downes, Tech Priorities for New Congress: From Old to New, CNET NEWS
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://commcns.org/s3hKma; Larry Downes, The Net Neutrality Fight Goes
On, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2011), http://commcns.org/skmDfp.30 Josh Smith, Senate Blocks Resolution to Overturn Net Neutrality Rules, THE ATLANTIC
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already tried to use the Open Internet Order as a bargaining chip in on-going
budget negotiations.31 Congress, meanwhile, has made life difficult for the
agency by threatening to hold up appropriations to implement the Order.32 Key
Members have increased oversight of the agency, and have demonstrated an
unwillingness to grant the FCC any new authority while the Open Internet
rules stand.
III. "NOT NEUTRALITY" OR GOVERNMENT TAKEOVER? THE
RULES REVEALED
In the end, the FCC voted to approve three new rules that apply to some
broadband Internet providers. One requires providers to disclose their network
management practices to consumers, which the majority refers to as
"transparency." 34 The second prohibits broadband Internet service providers
from blocking content, applications, services, and non-harmful devices; a
lesser standard is applied to mobile broadband providers.35 The last forbids
fixed broadband providers (e.g., cable and telephone) from exercising
"unreasonable" discrimination in delivering lawful network traffic requested
by consumers.36
There has been a great deal of criticism of the final rules, much of it
reaching a fevered pitch even before the text was made public. At one extreme,
advocates for stronger rules have rejected the new rules as meaningless, as
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://commcns.org/sCMMjb.3i Compare Kathleen Hennessey, Tensions Escalate Over Republican Budget Cuts, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, http://commcns.org/sKPQMH (discussing inclusion of amendment
barring funding for the FCC to enforce open Internet rules), with Julie Hirschfeld Davis et
al., Wrangle Over U.S. Budget Compromise Defines Next Two Years' Fiscal Debate,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2011), http://commcns.org/uRcaVN (noting the removal of Republican
language preventing funding for open Internet items being removed from the final Fiscal
Year 2011 spending package).
32 Juliana Gruenwald, GOP Taking Aim Again At Net Neutrality Through Spending
Measures, NAT'L J. (June 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/tkg9BE.
3 For example, House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) has said,
"Until net neutrality is rolled back, I don't believe Congress is going to be willing to give the
FCC any new power." See Sara Jerome, Issa: No Auction Authority for FCC Unless Net
Neutrality Is Repealed, THE HILL (Apr. 19, 2011), http://commcns.org/uUJLxU; Larry
Downes, Is Net Neutrality Blocking FCC Spectrum Auctions?, CNET NEWS (July 29, 2011),
http://commcns.org/sbi5zC.
4 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A § 8.3 (amending Part 8 of Title 47 of the
Code of Federal Regulations and requiring public disclosure of a broadband provider's
network management practices, performance and commercial terms).
3 Id., app. A § 8.5 (amending Part 8 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations and
prohibiting the blocking of the above-mentioned services, subject to "reasonable network
management").36 Id., app. A § 8.7 (adding Part 8 to the Code of Federal Regulations).
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"fake net neutrality," "not neutrality," or the latest evidence that the FCC
has been captured by the industries it regulates.39 On the other end, critics
decry the new rules as a government takeover of the Internet and blatant
censorship.40
In all the furor, one aspect of the rules that was not seriously discussed is
just how little the final text differs from the draft proposed by the FCC in
October 2009.41 Indeed, many of those critical of the final rules as being too
watered down forget their enthusiasm for the initial draft, which in key
respects did not change at all in the intervening year of comments,
conferences, hearings, and litigation.42
Many of the changes that were made can be traced to comments the FCC
received on the original draft, as well as interim proposals from industry and
Congress. In particular, a legislative framework offered jointly by Verizon and
Google in August 201043 and a bill circulated by Rep. Henry Waxman just
before the 2010 mid-term elections4 seemed to influence many of the FCC's
limited changes.
This section describes the final rules and notes how and where they differ
from the rules originally proposed.
37 See, e.g., Brian Montopoli, Liberals Lash Out at 'Fake Net Neutrality', CBS NEWS
(Dec. 21, 2010), http://commens.org/stXLD3; Nate Anderson, Why Everyone Hates New
Net Neutrality Rules-Even NN Supporters, ARs TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2010),
htt://commcns.org/rtBYmq.
Tim Karr, Not Neutrality, SAVE THE INTERNET (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://commcns.org/snPAtl. The Save the Internet campaign is managed by Free Press, an
ardent supporter of net neutrality.
" See id.
4o See, e.g., John Fund, The Net Neutrality Coup, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://commcns.org/slmTjM; Sara Jerome, Cato: Glenn Beck 'Mistaken' About Net
Neutrality, THE HILL (Dec. 9,2010), http://commcns.org/vjD51M.
41 Compare Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A, with In re Preserving the Open
Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Notice ofProposedRulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064,
app. A (Oct. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Open Internet NPRM].
Matt Peckham, Net Neutrality Proponents Sued by Net Neutrality Proponents?,
TECHLAND (Sept. 29, 2011), http://commcns.org/sU5ogL.
43 See Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal (Aug. 9, 2010) [hereinafter V-G
Proposal], http://commcns.org/vV23Uj; Alan Davidson, A Joint Policy Proposal for an
Open Internet, GOOGLE PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (Aug. 9, 2010), http://commens.org/vrAlAp.
As a proposed "legislative framework," the Verizon-Google proposal was addressed to
Congress and not the FCC. The two companies, in other words, agreed that any Open
Internet rules should be enacted legislatively rather than through an FCC rulemaking, in part
because of grave doubts about the agency's jurisdiction over broadband Internet service
providers. Ars Technica's Nate Anderson has done a great service in laying out the text of
the final rules side-by-side with the proposed legislative framework offered by Verizon and
Google. See Nate Anderson, Why is Verizon Suing Over Net Neutrality Rules It Once
Supported?, ARs TECHNICA (Jan. 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/vMjS4E.
Sara Jerome, Draft of Waxman's Net-Neutrality Legislation Leaked Amid Talks, THE




Compare the final text of the transparency rule with the version first
proposed by the FCC:
Proposed: Subject to reasonable network management, a provider of
broadband Internet access service must disclose such information as is
reasonably required for users and content, application and service providers
to enjoy the protections specified in this part.45
Final: A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network
management practices, performance and commercial terms of its broadband
Internet access service sufficient for consumers to make informed choices
regarding use of such services and for content, application, service and
device providers to develop, market and maintain Internet offerings.46
The final transparency rule is stronger than the original proposal and
clarifies what must be disclosed. Rather than the vague requirement in the draft
for disclosures sufficient to "enjoy the protections" of the Open Internet rules,
the final rule requires disclosures sufficient for consumers to make "informed
choices" about the services for which they pay. The final version creates a
standard that will be more easily enforced.
As the agency makes clear, the transparency rule has teeth. 47 While the
agency declines to make specific decisions about the contents of disclosures to
customers and how they must be communicated, it lays out a non-exhaustive
list of nine major categories of required information, including network
practices, performance characteristics, and commercial terms. 48 Given these
requirements, it's hard to imagine a complying document or posting that will
not run to several pages of very small text. Though similar to the version that
appeared in Rep. Waxman's draft legislation, 49 the final transparency rule also
reflects key concepts introduced in the Verizon-Google Legislative Framework
Proposal from earlier in the year.so
The rule's broad requirement, unfortunately, may be its undoing. Like other
mandatory disclosures accompanying complex products or services (e.g.,
mortgages, credit cards, pharmaceuticals, electronic devices, privacy notices,
etc.) information "sufficient" to make an "informed" choice is usually far more
45 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, app. A § 8.15.46 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A § 8.3.
47 Id IT 53-61.
481 Id. 156.
49 Compare Waxman Bill, supra note 44, with Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A
§ 8.3.
5o Compare V-G Proposal, supra note 43, at 1-2, with Open Internet Order, supra note 1,
app. A § 8.3.
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information than any non-expert consumer could possibly absorb and evaluate.
At least one study confirms what is obvious to any consumer-the more
information one is given, the less likely he or she is to pay attention to any of
it, including what may be important.5 1
The FCC recognizes that risk, but believes it has an answer. The majority
notes that a "key purpose of the transparency rule is to enable third-party
experts such as independent engineers and consumer watchdogs to monitor and
evaluate network management practices, in order to surface potential open
Internet violations." 52
Perhaps the agency has in mind here organizations like the Broadband
Internet Technical Advisory Group ("BITAG"), which was been established by
a broad coalition of participants in the Internet ecosystem to develop
"consensus on broadband network management practices or other related
technical issues." 53 Alternatively, it might imagine that some of the public
interest groups who have most strenuously rallied for the rules will become
responsible stewards of their implementation, trading the pens of political
rhetoric for responsible analysis and advocacy to their members and other
consumers.
Whether or not the disclosures change the behavior of ISPs or consumers,
they will certainly cost time and money for both. While the Commission
believes that, "[f]or a number of reasons . . . the costs of the disclosure rule we
adopt today are outweighed by the benefits of empowering end users and edge
providers to make informed choices," 54 many critics believe otherwise.55 The
Commission did not provide support for any of its "reasons," and offered no
details on either the likely costs or benefits of the transparency rule. Indeed, the
Commission refused to conduct any market power analysis, believing it
56
unnecessary.
51 See generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter?, NYU CENTER FOR
LAW, EcoNoMiCS, AND ORGANIZATION (2010), available at http://commcns.org/rtv3Nr.
52 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 160.
5 BROADBAND INTERNET TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP, http://www.bitag.org/ (last
visited Oct. 6, 2011).
54 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 59.
5 See Gerald R. Faulhaber and David J. Farber, The Open Internet: A Customer-Centric
Framework, 4 INT'L J. COMM. 302 (2010); Gerald R. Faulhaber, Economics of Net
Neutrality: A Review, COMMS. AND CONVERGENCE REV., vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. While the
Office of Management and Budget ultimately approved the order, it held up publication of
the new rules for several months. Rumors circulated that OMB was not satisfied the FCC
had given adequate consideration to the cost to providers of the transparency rule, as
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act. See Grant Gross, FCC Moves Toward
Implementing Net Neutrality Rules, COMPUTERWORLD (June 30, 2011),
http://commcns.org/uj96qg. See also Steve Augustino, Inside the Burdens of the Net
Neutrality Rules, TELECOM LAW MONITOR (Aug. 11, 2011), http://commcns.org/rJVh86.




The final version of the blocking rule consolidated the "Content,"
"Applications and Services," and "Devices" rules of the original draft.57 The
final rule states:
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access services, insofar
as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services or
non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.58
The limitations of the final blocking rule have generated the most criticism
of all the rules. First, copyright reformers objected to the word "lawful"
appearing in the rule.59 "Lawful" content, applications, and services do not
include activities that constitute copyright and trademark infringements. As a
result, the rule allows broadband providers to use whatever mechanisms they
want to reduce or eliminate traffic involving illegal file-sharing, spain, viruses
and other malware.60 A provider who completely blocks access to a website
offering unlicensed products is not violating the rules.61
The rule would appear to give ISPs wide latitude in dealing with "unlawful"
content. Even sites that are only partially unlawful, for example, may be
blocked without violating the rule. The majority, after all, finds that in the
interests of consumer privacy it is "generally preferable to neither require nor
encourage broadband providers to examine Internet traffic in order to discern
which traffic is subject to the rules," or perform what is known as deep packet
inspection.62 Without deep packet inspection, however, it is not technically
possible to determine whether a consumer is trying to access the lawful or
unlawful portion of a mixed website.
A second concern is the repeated caveat for "reasonable network
management," which gives access providers leeway to balance traffic during
peak times, limit users whose activity may be harming other customers (e.g.,
5 See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, app. A §§ 8.5-8.9.
58 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A § 8.5.
s9 Cindy Cohn, A Review of the Verizon and Google Net Neutrality Proposal,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 10, 2010), http://commcns.org/u3y4oD.
60 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 107, 111. See also id., app. A § 8.9 ("Nothing in
this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to
address copyright infringement or other unlawful activity.").
61 Id 107, 111. See also id., app. A § 8.9 ("Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable
efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement
or other unlawful activity."). Indeed, they may be required by court order to block access to
entire domains under the 2008 PRO-IP Act, which the Department of Homeland Security's
Immigration and Customs Enforcement division has been using to "seize" registrations of
domains it believes are involved in copyright and trademark infringement. See Larry
Downes, Five Essential Changes to Protect IP Act, CNET NEWS (Aug. 17, 2011),
htt ://commcns.org/ua5ell.
Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 48.
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continuous and very large file transfers), and other "legitimate network
management" purposes.63 Critics argue the more flexible definition of
"reasonable network management" in the final rules, which takes into account
"the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet
access service," removed the sting of the draft rule.6
But these are not substantive modifications. The original draft of the rules
included the limitation for "reasonable network management," and refused to
apply any of the rules to unlawful activities. The definition of "reasonable
network management" in the draft is different, but functionally equivalent, to
the final version.
The more substantial objection is to the special treatment for mobile
broadband providers, which may block applications, services, or devices
without violating the rule.66 Specifically, the rule mandates that mobile
broadband providers
shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites, subject to reasonable
network management, nor shall such person block applications that compete with the
providers' voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable network
management.67
This carve-out for mobile broadband is a significant departure from the
original rules, because the draft rule did not distinguish between fixed and
mobile Internet providers. The final rule also has an exception to the
exception for applications, such as VoIP and video, which compete with the
provider's own offerings.69 That special treatment does not keep mobile
providers from using "app stores" to exclude services they do not approve.70
The shift to a more nuanced rule should not be surprising. It was
foreshadowed by the Commissioners in the NPRM, who acknowledged that
different technologies "may require differences in how, to what extent, and
when the principles apply."71 For example, given the constraints on mobile
networks, what constitutes "reasonable network management" might include
"Id 82.
64 Compare id 82, with Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, $ 135. See also Rahul
Gaitonde, MetroPCS Accused of Violating Open Internet Order,
BROADBANDANDBREAKFAST (Jan. 20, 2011), http://commcns.org/sVtyl1.
66 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, 131-140.
6 Larry Downes, "Fake Neutrality" or Government Takeover?: Reading the FCC's Net
Neutrality Report (Part III), TECHLIBERATION (Jan. 5, 2011), http://commcns.org/uMTzPS.
See Press Release, Free Press Files Suit to Challenge FCC's Open Internet Rules, FREE
PREss (Sept. 28, 2011), http://commcns.org/sKfHpi.
67 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A § 8.5.
68 The October 2009 NPRM did express concern about applying the same rule to fixed
and mobile broadband. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, 13.
Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 101.7 1 Id 102.
71 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, 13.
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more expansive limits on customer use of high-bandwidth applications using
voice and video. Given the agency's unease about mobile, the NPRM sought
comment on these differences and asked for further comment in a later Public
72Notice. Several parties pointed out that wireless broadband is a newer
technology and one still very much in development. 73 They argued that robust
competition could likely police blocking practices unwanted by consumers.74
The majority took these concerns into account in the final rule, excluding
mobile providers from more stringent requirements for fixed broadband. This
was not so much a reversal as a return to prior policy. The FCC's 2005 Open
Internet policy statements-from which the draft and final rules derive-
applied only to fixed broadband access. As a result, it was the NPRM's
tentative inclusion of mobile broadband that surprised many in the industry.
C. Unreasonable Discrimination
The third rule states that providers of "fixed" broadband Internet access
service "shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network
traffic over a consumer's broadband Internet access service. Reasonable
network management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination." 77
There were two significant changes to the final rule. The draft rule, like the
blocking rules, would have applied to all broadband providers, including
72 See id. 1 171-174; Further Inquiry Into Two Under-Developed Issues in the Open
Internet Proceeding, Public Notice, 25 F.C.C.R. 12637 (Sept. 1, 2010).
7 Charles M. Davidson & Bret T. Swanson, Net Neutrality, Investment & Jobs: Assessing
the Potential Impacts of the FCC's Proposed Net Neutrality Rules on the Broadband
Ecosystem § 2.2.1 (Advanced Communications Law & Policy Institute, New York Law
School) (2010).
74 In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Comments ofAT&T,
GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 86-87 (Jan. 14, 2010).
In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband
Telecommunications Servs., Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co.
Provision of Enhanced Servs.; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer III
and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, Inquiring Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling,
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (Aug. 5, 2005).
76 See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, 13. The first indication that the majority
was considering a return to the original policy came with the V-G Proposal. Following
intense, multi-party private negotiations at the FCC, the former net neutrality adversaries
jointly released a proposed legislative framework that specified different treatment for
mobile broadband. As the V-G proposal noted, "Because of the unique technical and
operational characteristics of wireless networks, and the competitive and still-developing
nature of wireless broadband services, only the transparency principle would apply to
wireless at this time." See V-G Proposal, supra note 43.
n Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 68.
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mobile providers. However, applying the discrimination rule to mobile
providers proved to be more contentious than applying the blocking rules and
generated substantial opposition.79 In the end, the FCC agreed with the
Verizon-Google and Representative Waxman's proposals, which both
excluded mobile broadband from the discrimination rule.80
The second change involves a subtle but significant difference in
terminology. The draft rule required that "a broadband Internet access service
provider . . . treat lawful content, applications, and services in a
nondiscriminatory manner."81 The key change is between "nondiscrimination"
(draft), which prohibits all forms of differential network treatment, and
"unreasonable discrimination" (final), which allows discrimination so long as
it is not unreasonable.
The migration from a strict nondiscrimination rule subject to reasonable
network management to a rule against "unreasonable" discrimination can also
be traced through the proposed frameworks.82 According to the majority, the
final Order agrees "with the diverse group of commenters who argue that any
nondiscrimination rule should prohibit only unreasonable discrimination." 83
Though advocates for stronger rules complained that "unreasonable" is a
nebulous term,84 it should be noted that it is the only term of several proposed
with understood legal meaning, particularly in the context of the FCC's long
history of rulemaking and adjudication.85
7 See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, 13. See also Ensuring Competition on the
Internet: Net Neutrality and Antitrust: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 12th Cong. 112-
13 (201 1) (statement of Larry Downes, Senior Adjunct Fellow, TechFreedom).
See, e.g., In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry, Comments of
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Jan.
14,2010).
8 V-G Proposal, supra note 43; Waxman Bill, supra note 44, § 12(b).81 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, 16.
82 V-G Proposal, supra note 43 (captioning its version as a "Non-Discrimination
Requirement," but actually banning only "undue discrimination against any lawful Intemet
content, application, or service in a manner that causes meaningful harm to competition or
to users."); Waxman Bill, supra note 44, § 12(a)(2) (applying a somewhat different standard
for wireline providers, who "shall not unjustly or unreasonably discriminate in transmitting
lawful traffic over a consumer's wireline broadband Internet access service.").
83 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 77.
8 In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of
Google, Inc., GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Jan. 14,2010).
85 For example, the earliest railroad regulations, closely linked to the origin of the FCC
and its authority over communications industries, required "reasonable" rates of carriage,
and empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to intervene and eventually set the
rates itself, much as the FCC later did with telephony. See Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584
(1906); Mann-Elkins Act, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). One lesson of the railroad and telephone
examples, however, is the danger of turning over to regulators decisions about which
behaviors are reasonable. Briefly, regulatory capture often ends up leaving the industry
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Despite the negative connotations of the word in common use, not all
discrimination is bad. Discrimination simply means affording different
treatment to different things. As the Order makes clear, managing Internet
access and network traffic requires many forms of discrimination that are
entirely beneficial to overall network behavior and to the consumer's Internet
experience.86
The draft rule, as the FCC now acknowledges, was dangerously rigid . For
one thing, users may want some kinds of traffic-e.g., voice and video-to
receive higher priority than text and graphics, which do not suffer from latency
problems. Companies operating Virtual Private Networks for their employees
may likewise want to limit Web access to selected sites and activities for
workers while on the job.89 These and other examples require discrimination in
favor or against some traffic.
A strict nondiscrimination rule also would have discouraged, or perhaps
banned, tiered pricing, harming consumers who do not need the fastest speeds
and the highest volume of downloads to accomplish what they want to do
online. Without tiered pricing, such consumers effectively subsidize power-
users who, unsurprisingly, are the most vociferous objectors to pricing based
on usage.90 Discrimination may also be necessary to manage congestion during
peak usage periods or when failing nodes put pressure on the backbone. 91
Discrimination against spam, viruses and other malware, much of which is not
"lawful," is also permitted and indeed encouraged.92
So what forms of discrimination are "unreasonable" in the context of the
Open Internet? The Verizon-Google proposal gets to the heart of the problem
by singling out only discrimination that "causes meaningful harm to
competition or to users." 93 This is essentially the consumer welfare standard at
the heart of antitrust law, one that has long been proposed as the basis for
meaningful regulation of the Open Internet. 94
unable to respond to new forms of competition from disruptive technologies, with disastrous
consequences. See LARRY DOWNES, UNLEASHING THE KILLER APP: DIGITAL STRATEGIES FOR
MARKET DOMINANCE 24-25 (1998); LARRY DOWNES, THE LAWS OF DISRUPTION:
HARNESSING THE NEW FORCES THAT GOVERN LIFE AND BUSINESS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2009); Timothy B. Lee, The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality Without
Reyulation, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS 625, at 2 (Nov. 12, 2008), http://commcns.org/vTchNR.






92 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 90.
9 V-G Proposal, supra note 43.
94 See Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality
Debate?, 1 INT'L .. COMM. 493 (2007).
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The Order, however, rejected that understanding of "unreasonable," and
indeed, explicitly rejected any reliance on antitrust as a lodestone for
discrimination. The majority believes that "meaningful harm to competition or
to users" is simply too limited to protect their vision of the Open Internet.95
Instead of offering an alternative definition for "unreasonable," the majority
simply notes three types of provider discrimination that are of particular
"concern":
1. Discrimination that harms actual or potential competitors (e.g., VolP
providers of over-the-top telephone service, such as Skype or Vonage,
that competes with the provider's own telephone service);
2. "Inhibiting" end users from accessing content, services, and
applications "of their choice" (but see the no-blocking rule, above,
which already covers this); and
3. Discrimination that "impairs free expression," including slowing or
blocking access to a blog whose message the broadband provider does
not approve.96
On that last point, it is important to note that the FCC's ability to police
restrictions on "free expression" is greatly circumscribed. The passage of the
Communications Decency Act in 1996 wisely gave enormous discretion to
broadband Internet access providers and others to filter and otherwise curate
content they do not approve of or which they believe their customers do not
want to see.
The goal of the Act was to immunize early Internet providers like
CompuServe and Prodigy from efforts to exercise editorial control over
message boards whose content was provided by customers themselves. 98 The
law as written, however, gives providers broad discretion in determining what
types of content should be filtered. As long as the filtering is undertaken in
"good faith," there is no liability for the provider, who does not become a
"publisher" for purposes of defamation law. 99 The FCC acknowledges that
Section 230 limits the discrimination rule. 00
Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 42 n.141 and T 78.
9' Id. 1 75.
97 See generally The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
Specifically, § 230 of the Act states:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of.
any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material
that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.
47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
98 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
9 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
1 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 1 89 ("Our rule will not impose liability on a
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There are also Constitutional constraints on the FCC's ability to police how
providers narrow consumer access to content. The Constitution, after all,
forbids the FCC, but not private parties, from regulating in ways that violate
basic free speech principles.' Indeed, a decision by a broadband Internet
access provider to block specific content, so long as it is not motivated by
anticompetitive objectives, is likely to be a form of protected speech by the
provider. 02
The FCC has long tried to distinguish between protected speech by content
providers and the practices of ISPs, which the agency describes as mere
conduits for speech.103 The latter, the majority implies, enjoy reduced First
Amendment protections for their decisions to allow or forbid certain speech.104
The distinction between speakers and conduits of the speech of others,
however, may no longer be relevant. In Brown v. EMA, a case decided while
the Open Internet proceeding was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a
California statute that prohibited the sale of certain video games to minors on
the basis of violent content. At the outset of the Brown case, the Court
dismissed an attempt by Justice Alito to distinguish the statute as one that
merely punished "the sale or rental rather than the 'creation' or 'possession' of
violent depictions"-the former being entitled to lesser First Amendment
scrutiny.
But that distinction, the majority notes, appears nowhere in earlier cases,
"and for good reason: [i]t would make permissible the prohibition of printing
or selling books-though not the writing of them. Whether government
regulation applies to creating, distributing, or consuming speech," the Court
said, "makes no difference."
0 5
broadband provider where such liability is prohibited by section 230(c)(2) of the Act.").
101 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
102 For instance, local cable companies, which may be owned by individuals with strong
religious or other moral convictions, can refuse to carry programming and channels the
owner finds objectionable.
103 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 89. But see id. 141 ("Unlike cable television
operators, broadband providers typically are best described not as 'speakers,' but rather as
conduits for speech"). Cf id 1 143 ("Broadband providers are also free under this Order to
offer a wide range of 'edited' services. If, for example, a broadband provider wanted to offer
a service limited to 'family friendly' materials to end users who desire only such content, it
could do so under the rules we promulgate today.").
104 Id 89. But see id 1 141 ("Unlike cable television operators, broadband providers
typically are best described not as 'speakers,' but rather as conduits for speech"). Cf id
143 ("Broadband providers are also free under this Order to offer a wide range of 'edited'
services. If, for example, a broadband provider wanted to offer a service limited to 'family
friendly' materials to end users who desire only such content, it could do so under the rules
we romulgate today.").
Brown v. EMA, No. 08-1448, slip op. at 4 n.l (June 27, 2011). Randolph J. May has
long argued that any net neutrality regulations would violate the First Amendment, a view
that gains new support from the Brown case. See Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality
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It is not yet clear how Brown will influence future First Amendment
jurisprudence. But at least one leading proponent of the FCC's rulemaking
believes the case will significantly constrain the agency's ability to apply this
or any future nondiscrimination rule. The Brown decision, concludes Susan
Crawford, "may further strengthen the carriers' arguments that any
nondiscrimination requirement imposed on them should be struck down."
106
Though the discrimination rule was initially motivated by concerns about
"pay for priority" arrangements between ISPs and content providers, the Order
is unclear on whether that practice would actually violate the rule.107 While a
broadband provider's offering to prioritize the traffic of a particular source for
a premium fee "would raise significant cause for concern," the majority also
acknowledges that such a practice has thrived for years in the form of third
party Content Delivery Networks ("CDNs"). 1o CDNs replicate popular
content on servers placed in strategic proximity to key hubs in the Internet,
making it possible to speed such content to users when they request it.109 The
Order makes clear that CDNs, despite being "inconsistent" by design with the
theory of an Open Internet, are allowed.i1o
In the end, the discrimination rule as written does not appear to add much to
the blocking rule or to existing antitrust law. Discrimination against competing
over-the-top voice and video providers would already violate antitrust law.
Blocking or slowing access to disfavored content is subject to the blocking
rule. And broadband Internet access providers have significant leeway in
interfering with "free expression" rights of users both through Section 230 of
the Communications Act and as an expression of their own First Amendment
rights.
All this begs the question: what does the discrimination rule actually cover?
Perhaps the answer is found in the majority's negative inference: the explicit
rejection of the idea that the discrimination rule should be cabined by antitrust
law and its economic foundations. At the same time, however, the majority
fails to offer any alternative foundation that would direct its future enforcement
of the rule. The Order says only that "[t]he rule rests on the general proposition
that broadband providers should not pick winners and losers on the Internet,"
Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 3 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW
AND POLICY 198, 198 (2007). See also Larry Downes, Brown v. EMA and Net Neutrality?,
TECH LIBERATION FRONT (June 28, 2011), http://commcns.org/sTWOFn.
1o6 Susan Crawford, Reading Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (June 27,
2011), http://commcns.org/t8rGFo.
107 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 76.
108 Id. T 76 n.235.
109 Akamai Techs, Inc., v. Mass. Inst. Tech. 629 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
110 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 76 n.235 ("We reject arguments that our




even when doing so is independent of competitive interests."II What exactly
this "general proposition" means-and how "unreasonable" discrimination will
be judged in the course of enforcing the rules-remains to be seen.
Ill. WHY NOW? THE NEED FOR "PROPHYLACTIC" RULES
The majority's final rules, depending on how the FCC enforces them, may
have a significant impact on the network management and business practices
of broadband Internet service providers. Or, they may prove to be trivial,
requiring only additional and largely unread disclosures. The uncertainty is a
result of the agency's failure to make clear any specific behaviors it finds
dangerous to the Open Internet. Since the Commission did not perform an
economic analysis to identify market failures in the Open Internet Order, actual
prohibited conduct will be defined in future agency adjudications of consumer
complaints. The Order, as a result, is purposefully vague.
Indeed, the majority actually refers to the Order as a set of "prophylactic
rules," a phrase that appears nine times in some form in the 87-page report.112
As the phrase suggests, the FCC acknowledges that the problems to be solved
by these new regulations do not yet exist. Rather, the majority worries that the
lack of regulation and a rapidly changing competitive landscape could lead
some ISPs to harm content providers, consumers, or both.i11 By then, the
majority fears, it will be too late for regulation to "preserve" the Open Internet.
Nothing so perilous has happened in the last ten years, as broadband Internet
has become ubiquitous and increasingly feature-rich. But the Order notes that
"broadband providers potentially face at least three types of incentives to
reduce the current openness of the Internet." 1l4 These potential incentives
11 Id l 78; Randolph May, Infamous No. 78 (of the Net Neutrality Order), THE FREE
STATE FOUNDATION (Jan. 5, 2011), http://commcns.org/tHSkZD ("Paragraph No. 78 is so
important because, by disclaiming reliance only on anticompetitive injury and consumer
harm (generally present only when an Internet provider possesses market power), the
Commission leaves itself largely at sea in enforcing its rules.").
112 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, % 4, 11, 12, 23 n.60, 39, 41 & n.134, 85 n.266,
101.
113 Outside the scope of this article is the question of how much competition in consumer
broadband Internet access advocates of FCC intervention would consider adequate for the
market to police itself. The combination in the most populous regions of cable, DSL,
satellite and mobile providers does not appear to be enough. Many advocates are nostalgic
for the days of multiple dial-up ISPs created by the unbundling requirements of the 1996
Communications Act. But as all competitors were using the same infrastructure, it was a
strange kind of competition, one that resulted in the destruction, not the awakening, of the
communications industry. See Adam D. Thierer, UNE-P and the Future of Telecom
'Competition, 'TECHKNOWLEDGE (Feb. 1, 2003), http://commcns.org/ul3Uls.
114 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 21. These potential incentives include economic
incentives, such as the temptation to disadvantage VolP phone service providers who
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involve degrading or blocking competing content, charging access fees for
popular content providers, or slowing the connection to customers for content
providers who do not pay premium fees to the ISP.
It appears that the majority's principal fear is that large, multi-service ISPs
may exert increased control over their customers' use of the open Internet.
Dominant broadband providers, for example, might one day block access for
Web entertainment (e.g. Hulu, Netflix) or telephone services (e.g. Vonage,
Skype, or Google Voice) that compete with services offered by the ISPs in
their role as television and telephone service providers. Alternatively, ISPs
could use their customers as hostages in negotiations with popular content
providers, demanding access fees or other kinds of tribute in exchange for
faster delivery, or perhaps any delivery at all.
Each of these "incentives" does not necessarily require FCC regulation.
They would likely be policed by competitive pressures, consumer outrage,
Congressional inquiries, or some combination of all three. Not surprisingly,
there is a dearth of evidence that this kind of interference with the free Internet
has ever occurred. Though the NPRM sought examples of non-neutral
behavior,115 the sum total of the FCC's evidence, collected over the course of
more than a year with the help of advocates who believe the "Internet as we
know it" is at death's door,116 is nearly non-existent. Regardless, the majority
weakly concluded that broadband providers will soon "face" "potential
incentives" to destroy the technology that is the source of their revenue.
A. The Four Incidents
Exemplars of instances where broadband providers acted to "limit
openness" should have been the heart of the Order. Instead, the Order confines
four instances into just three paragraphs. To prove that these "dangers to
Internet openness" are not "speculative or merely theoretical," these
paragraphs describe four worrisome incidents between 2005 and 2010 that
together could constitute enough evidence, according to the majority, that the
Internet ecosystem is under siege. A close look at these incidents, however,
compete with similar services offered by the ISP or a parent company, incentives to increase
revenues by charging "edge" application providers for access to the ISP's customers, and
incentives to degrade the performance of edge providers who do not pay for priority. Id IT
21-34. As the verb tense implies, all the supporting citations for these paragraphs are
hyvotheticals.
15 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, 50.
116 See, e.g., Megan Tady, The End of the Internet as We Know it?, IN THESE TIMES (Dec.
20, 2010), http://commcns.org/rCpCO2; Timothy Karr; Obama FCC Caves on Net
Neutrality--Tuesday Betrayal Assured, THE HUFFINGTON PosT (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://commcns.org/soMvoh.
1 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 35-37.
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suggests that they prove precisely the opposite:
Madison River, a local ISP that was "a subsidiary of a telephone company"
settled claims it had interfered with Voice over Internet Telephony (VolP)
applications used by its customers.
Comcast agreed to change its network management techniques after the
company acknowledged slowing or blocking packets using the BitTorrent
protocol.
After an unnamed "mobile wireless provider" contracted with an online
payment service, the provider "allegedly" blocked customers from using
competing services to pay for purchases made with mobile devices.
AT&T, at the demand of Apple, initially restricted the types of
applications-prohibiting VolP and video service Slingbox-that customers
could download for their iPhones.1 8
Among these four may be evidence of broadband providers acting contrary
to the spirit of the Open Internet, and in some cases violating the FCC's 2005
Internet Policy Statement.119 Nonetheless, in the world of regulatory
efficiency, focusing this much attention on just four incidents of potential or
"alleged" market failures is a remarkable achievement indeed. Even assuming
that these actors harbored the worst possible motives, these incidents do not
amount to a pattern of any kind of behavior.
In reality, however, most of these purported instances have little or nothing
to do with the kinds of potential "incentives" that motivated the rulemaking.
Nor did any of the incidents require new regulations-all four were quickly
and efficiently corrected. Madison River was resolved with a consent decree
that explicitly eschewed any factual determinations.120 Comcast was resolved
quickly and privately long before the agency completed its adjudication.121 The
' Id T 35.
9 See generally Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband
Telecommunications Servs., Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co.
Provision of Enhanced Servs.; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer III
and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, Inquiring Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling,
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (Aug. 5, 2005).
120 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 35; In re Madison River Commc'ns LLC and
Affiliated Cos., Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 10 (Mar. 3, 2005).
121 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 35; In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and
Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer
Applications, Broadband Industry Practices Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory
Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement
and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Reasonable Network Management," Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 54-55 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast
Memorandum].
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case of the unnamed mobile wireless provider showed no actual harm, and
apparently did not even lead to a complaint being filed with the FCC.122 Lastly,
the iPhone incident was resolved quickly, as the FCC acknowledges, when
customers put pressure on Apple to allow AT&T to permit the restricted
applications. 123
Three of the four incidents may not even violate the final rules. For
example, Comcast's actions involved blocking or slowing of packets using the
BitTorrent protocol.124 Despite the efforts by the company that markets
BitTorrent to promote lawful uses of the standard, academic studies performed
since the Comcast case was decided have found that 90-99% of BitTorrent
traffic still involves unlicensed copyright infringement.25 Given that the no-
blocking rule prohibits blocking of "lawful content, applications, services or
non-harmful devices,'"126 the vast majority of BitTorrent traffic is not subject to
the FCC's new rules.
The majority's confusion over the specifics of the BitTorrent incident
affected the entire proceeding. While the Order repeatedly cites the Comcast
case as the leading justification for the rules,127 the majority is equally adamant
in encouraging network providers to move aggressively against customers who
use the Internet to violate copyright law. The Order makes crystal clear that the
new rules "do not prohibit broadband providers from making reasonable
efforts to address the transfer of unlawful content or unlawful transfers of
content" and that the "open Internet rules should not be invoked to protect
copyright infringement. . . . "l28
122 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 35. The FCC's footnote is to comments filed by
the ACLU. It is unclear which mobile wireless provider is being referenced. Id. 35 n.106.
123 id 1 35 n.107 (citing In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry
Practices, Reply Comments of DISH Network L.L.C., GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket
No. 07-52, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2010)).124 See generally Comcast Memorandum, supra note 121, % 4-11.
125 See Ed Felten, Census of Files Available via BitTorrent, PRINCETON CENTER FOR
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY (Jan. 29, 2010), http://commcns.org/v0zGli; Mike
Masnick, Of Course Most Content Shared on BitTorrent Infringes, but that's Meaningless,
TECHDIRT (Feb. 2, 2010), http://commcns.org/uRlYqN; Renai LeMay, 89% ofBitTorrent is
1llegal: Study, PC WORLD (July 23, 2010), http://commcns.org/sunqq9.
1 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A §§ 8.5, 8.9 (amending Part 8 of Title 47 of
the Code of Federal Regulations). See also A Review of the Verizon and Google Net
Neutrality Proposal, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://commcns.org/u3y4oD. The nominal complainants in the Comcast case were using the
protocol for legal file transfers, so the question of infringement and the meaning of "lawful"
content under the FCC's earlier open Internet policy statements was not raised in either the
adjudication or in the appeal. Comcast Memorandum, supra note 121, T 42.
127 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, TT 35, 36 n. lI11, 63 n. 168, 75 n.227, 78 n.245.
12 Id. 11 107, 111. See also id., app. A § 8.9 (amending Part 8 of Title 47 of the Code of
Federal Regulations) ("Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of
broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or other unlawful
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The vast majority of BitTorrent traffic can and indeed should-according to
the Order-be blocked. Since some BitTorrent traffic is legal, however,
Comcast's response would appear to violate the "blocking" rule. In order to
allow only the small percentage of lawful BitTorrent packets that cannot and
should not be blocked, broadband access providers will need to develop
sophisticated and invasive techniques that necessarily involve deep packet
inspection of a great number of BitTorrent-related packets.129 But that solution
is also disfavored by the majority, and raises other concerns, including the
privacy of innocent users whose packets would need to be opened and
inspected. 130
Privacy concerns led the majority to discourage network management
techniques that "examine Internet traffic." 131 Instead, the Commission
expressed a preference that providers operate at a less intrusive level to
implement the new rules.132 Ironically, the Commission's preference for less
intrusive network management methodologies would support exactly what the
Commission chided Comcast for doing in the first place, i.e. to identify a
particular file transfer protocol used almost exclusively for illegal transfers
and, without investigating individual packets, block or at least disrupt its use
on the network. While that practice would need to be disclosed under the new
"transparency" rule, 133 the one incident the rules were intended to prevent
remains not only legal, but actually encouraged.
activity."). Perhaps the FCC, which continues to refer to BitTorrent as an "application" or
believes it to be a website, simply doesn't understand how the BitTorrent protocol actually
works. Cf id. 36 n.1 11 (applications); id. 78 n.245 (edge provider). BitTorrent is neither
an application nor a website; it is a file sharing protocol, or as the company that develops it
says, a set of "advanced, innovative technologies to efficiently deliver large files across the
Internet." See BITrORRENT, http://commcns.org/v63iby (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
129 Ben Jones, Deep Packet Inspection and Your Privacy, TORRENTFREAK (June 29,
2008), http://commcns.org/w24z 1W.
130 In re A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Comments of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, GN Docket No. 09-51 at 7 (June 8, 2009) (stating that Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) will provide ISPs with access to the content of all unencrypted Internet
traffic that ISP customers send or receive and that DPI can generate and preserve logs of
users' Internet activities).131 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 48.
32 Id. ("[O]pen Internet rules applicable to fixed broadband providers should protect all
types of Internet traffic, not just voice or video Internet traffic. This reflects, among other
things, our view that it is generally preferable to neither require nor encourage broadband
providers to examine Internet traffic in order to discern which traffic is subject to the
rules."). Prior to the FCC's adjudication of Comcast, the company voluntarily modified its
practice to focus on managing high-bandwidth customers rather than particular protocols.
See Arun Radhakrishnan, Comcast and BitTorrent Collaborate on Network Traffic
Management, TECHREPUBLIC (Mar. 28, 2008), http://commens.org/tYd79r. The majority
approves of the new approach. See Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 56 n. 177.
Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 56 n.177 (stating Comcast's congestion
management practices likely satisfy the transparency rule).
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Under the more limited rules for mobile broadband providers contained in
the final Order, the incidents involving the unnamed mobile provider and the
iPhone would also most likely not violate the new rules. While not enough is
known about the unnamed mobile provider incident to really understand what
is "alleged" to have happened, the no-blocking rule says only that mobile
broadband Internet providers "shall not block consumers from accessing lawful
websites, subject to reasonable network management; nor shall [providers]
block applications that compete with the provider's voice or video telephony
service, subject to reasonable network management."l 34 Since a mobile
payment application is neither a website nor a competing voice or video
service, the unnamed mobile provider incident appears to be outside the new
rules.
Similarly, in the fourth incident, it was Apple, not AT&T, that wanted to
limit VoIP, arguing that it "alter[ed] the iPhone's distinctive user experience
by replacing the iPhone's core mobile telephone functionality and Apple user
interface with its own user interface." 35 Given that Apple is not a "provider"
of broadband Internet access, it is not subject to the rules. Moreover, even if
mobile payment or VolP was considered a competing "voice or video
telephony service," the wireless rule doesn't apply to app stores.136 In other
words, if either of these incidents involved the rejection of proposed apps for a
mobile device, there would be no violation of the new rules regardless of
whether the device manufacturer or the broadband Internet access provider
made the decision.
There is another basis on which the fourth incident remains legal: it is likely
an example of "reasonable network management." The rule says that a practice
is "reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network
purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture of the
broadband Internet access service."137 Voice and video apps, depending on
how they have been implemented, can put excessive strain on a mobile
broadband network. Blocking particular VoIP services or apps like Slingbox,
consequently, is likely to constitute reasonable network management.
B. Is the Real Problem a Lack of Competition?
The FCC has provided only four purported examples of non-neutral
134 Id., app. A § 8.5.
135 Apple Answers the FCC's Questions, APPLE INC., http://commons.org/vOK3kJ (last
visited Oct. 7, 2011).136 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 102 ("The prohibition on blocking applications
that compete with a broadband provider's voice or video telephony services does not apply
to a broadband provider's operation of application stores or their functional equivalent.").
"' Id., app. A § 8.11(d).
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behavior by ISPs in ten years, and has adopted rules that would probably only
apply, at best, to one of these instances. So perhaps these four incidents are not
actually what drove the FCC to regulate. Many regulatory advocates propose
an alternative: that the real problem is a lack of "competition" for
broadband. According to the 2010 National Broadband Plan, 5% of the U.S.
population remains without access to any wireline broadband provider, while
2% do not have access to a mobile broadband provider.139 In many parts of the
country, only two Internet access providers are available and in others, the
offered speeds of alternatives vary greatly, leaving users without high-speed
alternatives. 140
If limited competition is the real source of concern, however, the FCC has
historically proven itself the wrong agency to correct it. Since the first
deployment of high-speed Internet, multiple technologies have been developed
to deliver broadband access to consumers, including DSL (copper), coaxial
cable (cable), satellite, mobile (3G and now 4G), wireless (WiFi and WiMax),
and broadband-over-power-lines (BPL).141
Rather than promote these technologies, the FCC has done just the opposite.
In many instances, for example, the agency has sided with state governments,
who argued successfully that they can prohibit municipalities from offering
telecommunications service that might compete with local franchising
monopolies.142 The Commission has also dragged its feet on approving trials
for BPL, contributing to continued setbacks in deploying the technology.143
If ISPs engage in anti-competitive behavior now or in the future, existing
antitrust law, enforceable by either the Department of Justice or the Federal
Trade Commission, provides much more specifically targeted tools both to
prosecute and remedy activities that genuinely harm consumers. To
demonstrate a so-called "vertical exclusion," for example, in which a dominant
provider abuses its power over access to a key input to an upstream or
downstream business, the Supreme Court has moved from a rule of per se
131 Id 32.139 FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 37 fig. 4-A, 40 fig. 4-
E (2010), http://commcns.org/sCCj9m.
140 Id.
141 CORNING, BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 2-7 (2005),
http://commcns.org/rOgg51. BPL in particular is a promising technology for rural users, a
group that is more likely that others to have no or limited broadband options today. THE
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 139, at 37, 39.
142 See, e.g., Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 130-31, 140-41 (2004).
13 See American Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 230-32 (D.C. Cir.
2008); ARRL Comments on FCC's Proposed Establishment of Rural Broadband Plan,
ARRL (Mar. 30, 2009), http://commcns.org/tJCryR (quoting ARRL General Council Chris
Imlay that "almost a year after the Court's decision, the Commission has done 'literally
nothing' to comply with the mandated instructions").
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illegality to one requiring proof of "demonstrable economic effect."144 Mere
market dominance, in other words, is not enough to trigger antitrust remedies.
Even if limited competition in some areas of the country leads to genuine
consumer harm, as may have been the case in Madison River, there is no
reason to believe any version of net neutrality rules would correct it. As
scholar Christopher Yoo has long argued, net neutrality regulations are not the
solution to antitrust harms:
The imposition of network neutrality would not increase the number of last-
mile options one iota and thus would not change the bargaining power between
last-mile providers and end users. Given that network neutrality would,
however, leave last-mile providers bargaining power vis-h-vis end users
unaffected, one would not expect network neutrality to lead to any reduction in
the prices charged to end users. Network neutrality would have a dramatic
effect on the other side of the two-sided market by affecting how last-mile
providers and content/applications providers divide up those rents. From this
perspective, network neutrality has less to do with benefiting consumers and
more to do with adjusting the bargaining power between the Verizons and the
Googles of the world.145
If lack of competition is motivating the net neutrality rules, in any event, the
majority makes no effort to argue that case. Instead, the rules seem to rest on a
general anxiety that ISPs will use access to their customers to shape
competition in Internet content for many undefined reasons. The "broad
purposes" of the discrimination rule, according to the majority, "cannot be
achieved by preventing only those practices that are demonstrably
anticompetitive or harmful to consumers.',146 Instead, "the rule rests on the
general proposition that broadband providers should not pick winners and
losers on the Intemet-even for reasons that may be independent of providers'
competitive interests or that may not immediately or demonstrably cause
substantial consumer harm."'1
47
This is at best a novel theory of protecting the "public interest"-one that
does not require a showing of either anti-competitive behavior or harm to
consumers before imposing sanctions on a broadband Internet access provider
44 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724, 726 (1988).145 Yoo, supra note 94, at 515.
146 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 78. See also id. 42 n. 141 (stating that the FCC
has a duty to "promote deployment of advanced telecommunications capability, ensure that
charges in connection with telecommunications services are just and reasonable, ensure the
orderly development of local television broadcasting, and promote the public interest
through spectrum licensing").
147 Id 78. See also id. 42 n.141; Randolph May, Infamous No. 78 (of the Net
Neutrality Order), FREE STATE FOUNDATION (Jan. 5, 2011), http://commcns.org/tHSkZD;




IV. "NOSTALGIA FOR THE PRESENT"-WHICH INTERNET IS BEING
PRESERVED?
At best, one can only say that the majority recognizes there are no threats it
can credibly point to today and reserves for future discretion the determination
of practices it finds violate the spirit of the Open Internet.148 But it is still
unclear why the FCC believes it can "prophylactically" solve a problem
dealing with an emerging, rapidly-evolving new technology that has thrived in
the last decade in part because it was unregulated.
Given that evolution, a more fundamental question is whether the Internet
the FCC is trying to "preserve" even exists anymore, or whether it ever did.
The idea of the Open Internet is simple: consumers of broadband Internet
access should have the ability to surf the web as they please and enjoy the
content of their choice, without interference by access providers who may have
financial, competitive, or other reasons to shape or limit that access.149
Translating this idea into enforceable regulations, however, is difficult, not
least because the "Internet" the majority refers to throughout the Order is very
much a moving target.
The FCC, of course, has no authority over the actual protocols and standards
that define the network-the true meaning of the "Internet" the Order refers
to-and makes no pretense of trying to regulate them.150 Instead, the majority
is concerned with what they describe as the Internet ecosystem-a phrase that
appears eight times in the Order.151 This ecosystem consists of broadband
Internet access providers and their customers, as well as a remarkably varied
range of public, private, for-profit and not-for-profit entities that offer devices,
software, services and content. In particular, the new rules are addressed to
providers of broadband Internet access service, a subset of the larger class of
ISPS.152
The rules proscribe general behaviors and network management techniques
the majority believes would violate the spirit of the Open Internet.15 3 In the ten
148 Channeling Justice Stewart's confidence if not his candor in confessing that whatever
obscenity means, "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
149 Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141,147 (2003).
150 Rob Frieden, Assessing the Merits of Network Neutrality Obligations at Low, Medium
and High Network Layers, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 49, 50 (2010).
151 See, e.g., Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 53 ("Promoting competition throughout
the Internet ecosystem is a central purpose of these rules.").
152 Id., app. A § 8.11(a).
153 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Remarks, Preserving a Free and Open Internet:
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years during which broadband Internet access has evolved, however, many
participants in the Internet ecosystem have long-deployed network
management techniques that, on their face, are "inconsistent" (to use the
majority's word) with the idea of the Open Internet.
Examples of inconsistent techniques include unremarkable engineering
features like backbones, peering, caching and content delivery networks,
specialized services such as virtual private networks, IP-based television and
telephone, and highly-limited broadband access offered by coffee shops and
other public locations or through ancillary services such as Amazon's Kindle
network and video game consoles.' 54 These techniques and services are
essential in delivering broadband Internet that operates smoothly, both
technically and economically. Yet many of these examples prioritize some
content over others, offer premium access to content providers willing to pay
-155for it, or limit customer access to competing content or services.
To preserve the basic premise of Open Internet regulations without
condemning long-standing practices, the rules carve out a maze of exceptions
and caveats that effectively grandfathers these techniques. 156 All the
exemptions have in common is that together they represent a decade of
innovation in network management and infrastructure optimization. Taken
together, however, they render the final regulations largely incoherent. In
translating the aspiration for an Open Internet into enforceable rules applied to
the Internet as it really exists, the FCC has tied itself in Gordian knots.
1. The Mythical Neutrality Principle
The Internet's defining feature is its basic protocols, known as TCP/IP.157
Since they are non-proprietary, anyone can use them, any device can support
them, and every node is a peer without having to pay royalties or licensing fees
to network providers.158 As the "lowest common denominator" standard,
TCP/IP benefited from network effects to overtake several popular proprietary
standards, including IBM's System Network Architecture and Digital
Equipment Corporation's DECnet. 159 The Internet is now seen as a vehicle for
A Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity (Sept. 21, 2009),
http://commens.org/sKqaOL.
54 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 1 47.
1ss Cody Vitello, Network Neutrality Generates a Contentious Debate Among Experts:
Should Consumers be Worried?, 22:4 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 513, 529 (2010).
156 See discussion, infra Part IV.A.2.
1s7 See Paul DiMaggio et al., Social Implications of the Internet, ANN. REV. Soc. 307, 308
(2001).
158 Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, COLUM. L.
REV. 534, 542-543 (2003).
1 Brian M Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY,
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true collaboration and consciousness-raising, with intense innovation by
content and application providers at the "edge" of the network.
The ideal of net neutrality-a level playing field among all websites,
applications, and devices-is both a persistent and compelling myth. The
concept evokes the heroism of an entrepreneur in his garage, striving to build
the next Yahoo or Google, Facebook, or Groupon with a great idea, technical
skills, willingness to sacrifice sleep and social life. These entrepreneurs work
for the promise of a successful IPO, connecting people and information in new
and unexpected ways.
If all goes well, the application also reaps the benefit of network effects,
goes viral, and quickly becomes the next "killer app." Human testing and
general use of the application can begin without any government regulation or
license or license applications process. No creativity-challenged corporations
can stop the inventor. Internet access provider cannot limit the entrepreneur's
access to a global consumer market. No competing content provider can buy
the available market channels and freeze the start-up.
That, at least, is the sense of an "Open Internet" as Chairman Genachowski
defines it. That Internet, however, never existed.160 A considerably more
mundane version of that ideal did thrive the last half of the 1990s, but it was
always subject to, and fueled by, a wide range of non-neutral innovations in
network management. Few consumers may be aware of the existence or details
of network optimization algorithms, content delivery networks, complex
peering arrangements, caching and edge servers, peer-to-peer networking,
mirror sites, specialized services, virtual private networks, packet prioritization
based on media type, spam and other malware filters, or dynamic IP addresses
or domain name redirection; but all of these elements are characteristics of
today's network infrastructure.
Each of these network elements speeds up delivery of the most bandwidth
intensive content.16' At the same time, every one of these innovations arguably
violate the neutrality principle. They treat packets with a certain file size,
popularity, media characteristic, or recipient differently, prioritizing some and
http://commcns.org/tdekMI (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
o Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Remarks, Preserving a Free and Open Internet:
A Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity (Sep. 21, 2009),
http://commcns.org/sKqaOL ("This is not about government regulation of the Internet. It's
about fair rules of the road for companies that control access to the Internet. We will do as
much as we need to do, and no more, to ensure that the Internet remains an unfettered
platform for competition, creativity, and entrepreneurial activity.").
161 See George Ou, Managing Broadband Networks: A Policymaker's Guide,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION 10-11 (Dec. 2008),
http://commcns.org/swnJe8 (explaining the need for quality-of-service mechanisms to
prioritize network traffic).
110 [Vol. 20
Unscrambling the FCC's Net Neutrality Order
slowing others.162 For example, video often consists of very large files, and
component packets must arrive without much latency to create a high-quality
streaming display.163
That reality is far removed from the heroic idealization of the Internet as a
wide-open frontier, though the former remains a compelling myth. Consider
Chairman Genachowski's vision of an Open Internet, part of his September
2009 announcement of the upcoming NPRM:
The Internet's creators didn't want the network architecture-or any single
entity-to pick winners and losers. Because it might pick the wrong ones.
Instead, the Internet's open architecture pushes decision-making and
intelligence to the edge of the network-to end users, to the cloud, to
businesses of every size and in every sector of the economy, to creators and
speakers across the country and around the globe. In the words of Tim
Berers-Lee, the Internet is a 'blank canvas'-allowing anyone to contribute
and to innovate without permission.
2. The Exceptions that Undo the Rules
The Internet undoubtedly changed the trajectory of computing, upending
giants and unleashing tremendous creativity. But the network itself was never a
"blank canvas," with all its intelligence residing at the edge of the network. As
the majority came to understand this over the course of the Open Internet
proceeding, that knowledge was never internalized or reflected in the rules.
Instead, the majority explained away the reality of modem network
management in over a dozen exceptions, exemptions and exclusions to the
final rules.
The most significant of these is the exception for "reasonable network
management," which applied to all six of the draft rules.165 The NPRM, in turn
defined reasonable network management as all "reasonable practices"
broadband Internet access providers undertook to "reduce or mitigate the
effects of congestion on the network or to address quality-of-service
162 See Lee, The Durable Internet, supra note 85, at 7-9 (explaining quality-of-service
mechanisms, the mechanism by which these innovations operate).
1 Ou, supra note 161, at 3-4 (discussing latency and jitter tolerance for different types of
ap lications).
? Chairman Julius Genachowski, Preserving a Free and Open Internet, supra note 160.
Compare John Perry Barlow, A Declaration ofthe Independence ofCyberspace (Feb. 1996),
http://commcns.org/uB9RNx ("We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege
or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. We are
creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how
sin ular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity.").




What were these practices and how extensive were their use? The
Commissioners acknowledged that they did not know. Indeed, there was a
great deal about broadband the FCC did not know in October 2009, largely
because the agency had never been authorized to regulate it. Congress
delegated minimal regulatory oversight over broadband access to the FCC in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.167
That the Commission could not regulate broadband was not a controversial
reading of the law. In the 2005 Brand X case, the agency itself argued that
Internet access over cable was outside its regulatory powers.168 Following
BrandX, the agency ruled that DSL service was likewise outside its authority,
leaving the FCC with substantive powers only over dial-up Internet access, a
feature of its longstanding power over traditional telephone service. 169
It is little surprise, then, that the FCC began the Open Internet proceeding
with an outdated and incomplete understanding of how the Internet operates.
Throughout the NPRM, the Commission separately sought comments eighty
times on everything from the current state of the Internet ecosystem, to the
technologies of broadband access, network management principles already in
place, and the competitive nature of the broadband access market. 170In
response, the Order lists over 450 sources of comments and replies, many of
which addressed themselves to educating the FCC on the technologies it had
undertaken to regulate.
As a result of this feedback, the final rules added several additional
exceptions that effectively authorize a wide range of practices allowing
broadband Internet access providers to act "inconsistently" with neutrality
principles yet still not violate the rules. The following is a list of exceptions
66 See id., app. A § 8.3.
67 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 34(a)(2), I 10 Stat. 56
(1996); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (1934); CHARLES B. GOLDFARB,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND REFORM, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, 1-4 (January 13, 2006).
168 Nat'l Cable Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 1002-03
(2005).
16 In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice ofInquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 7866,
f1 (June 17, 2010).
170 Larry Downes, Preserving the Internet, But Which One? Reading the FCC's Net
Neutrality Order Part IV(Jan. 12, 2011), http://commcns.org/tyUcB7.
171 See Larry Dignan, FCC Seeks Comment on Two Key Elements of Google-Verizon Net
Neutrality Proposal, BETWEEN THE LINES (Sept. 1, 2010), http://commcns.org/tRV73S;
Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. C; Letter from Albert E. Dotson, Jr. et al., to Julius
Genachowski, Chairman, FCC (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://commcns.org/snJRAf; In
re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Reply Comments of the
Mobile Internet Content Coalition, GN Docket No 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Apr. 26,
2010), http://commcns.org/rx0zNw.
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delineated in the Report and Order, together offering a window into the FCC's
education on the Internet and the difficulty of "preserving" its neutrality:
1. An exemption from many of the rules for providers of mobile
broadband Internet access, including the "no unreasonable
discrimination" rule and some of the "no blocking" rule.172
2. An explicit exemption from the "no blocking" rule for app stores and
other control mechanisms used by mobile broadband providers, device
manufacturers, operating system developers, or some combination
thereof.173
3. A change from a strict "nondiscrimination" rule for wireline providers
to a rule prohibiting only "unreasonable discrimination."
4. A definition of "broadband Internet access service" that limits
application of the rules only to providers of a "mass market retail
service" providing "the capability to transmit data to and receive data
from all or substantially all Internet endpoints." 75 That change leaves
out a range of relatively new Internet devices and services-including
the Amazon Kindle, game consoles, cars, TVs and home appliances-
that offer some form of web access incidental to their main purpose
for communicating with the network.176
5. A broader definition of "reasonable network management" that
includes any practice that is "appropriate and tailored to achieving a
legitimate network management purpose."177
6. An exemption for virtual private networks, which use much of the
same infrastructure as the public Internet. 78
7. An exemption for CDNs and co-located servers that put popular
content in closer proximity to important network nodes and therefore
179
speed its transmission to requesting users.
8. An exemption for multichannel video programming services (e.g.,
AT&T's U-verse) that use TCP/IP protocols and existing Internet
infrastructure to deliver television programmin to customers.SO
9. An exemption for Internet backbone services.
10. An exemption for hosting or data storage services.182
11. Exemptions for "coffee shops, bookstores, airlines and other entities
when they acquire Internet service from a broadband provider to
172 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. A §§ 8.5-8.7.
173 Id. 102.
174 Id., app. A § 8.7.
175 Id., app. A § 8. 11 (a).
76 Id. 47.177 Id., app. A § 8.11(d) and 82.
178 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, T 47.






enable their patrons to access the Internet from their
establishments."183
12. An exemption from the discrimination rule for "existing arrangements
for network interconnection, including existing peering
arrangements."184
13. An exemption for "specialized services," including multichannel video
programming (see above) or facilities-based VolP (e.g., Comcast
Digital Voice), that "share capacity with broadband Internet access
services over providers' last-mile facilities."185
14. A hedge on whether "paid priority" of some content, either that of the
access provider or a third party, constitutes aper se violation of the
"unreasonable discrimination" rule, and an explicit rejection of the
argument that CDNs constitute illegal "pay for priority" even though
they have the same effect on the consumer experience as prohibited
prioritization schemes.186
15. Recognition that end-users may subscribe to Internet access services
that limit their choice of content, including services that offer parental
controls or which "allow end users to choose a service that provides
access to the Internet but not to pornographic websites." Further,
"[b]roadband providers are also free under this Order to offer a wide
range of 'edited' services," including a "service limited to 'family
friendly' materials." 88
16. Recognition that existing federal law allows all Internet Service
Providers to "restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable." 89
B. The Majority on the Precipice of Understanding
These exceptions, according to the majority, represent services,
technologies, or service providers that appear to operate "inconsistently" with
the neutrality principle, but which nonetheless provide crucial and valuable
benefits to consumers. Each exception also reflects an important change to the
Internet's architecture and service models as they have evolved over the last
1" Id 52.
184 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 67 n.209. Note that this exception probably
means the public fight between Comcast and Level 3 over their peering agreements
probably does not violate the rules. See Marguerite Reardon and Elinor Mills, Level 3 Takes
Spat with ComcastPublic, CNET NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010), http://commcns.org/vQgliy.
185 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 112-114.
186 Id. f 76-77.
87 Id. 89.
Id. T 143. But cf. id. 14 1.
89 Id. 89 n.279.
[Vol. 20114
Unscrambling the FCC's Net Neutrality Order
fifteen years. Together, they demonstrate that the Internet's core technologies
are still in development and need continued freedom from detailed regulatory
interference in order to evolve.
The mobile Internet is given special treatment, for example, because it is
"evolving rapidly." 190 The fixed Internet, however, is also evolving rapidly, as
many of these exemptions implicitly recognize. Paying a CDN to replicate
your content and co-locate servers at key network access points is surely
"paying for priority."l91 The cached content will arrive at a user's computer
faster than similar or even competing content that does not subscribe to a
CDN. It puts a start-up without the funds for similar services at a competitive
disadvantage. But for consumers, that feature is an improvement. It ensures the
most popular and therefore most frequently accessed content is not slowed
down by its popularity. Still, it is not "neutral."
As the exceptions piled up, the majority should have realized the futility of
making rules for an ecosystem very much in transition. Instead, they remain
fixated on maintaining an Open Internet even though they now had ample
evidence that neutrality is a virtue more honored in the breach. The final
Report uses the word "traditional" 25 times, the word "historical" or
"historically" nine times, and the word "typical" or "typically" 21 times.192
These are the only justifications for the exceptions, and they undermine the
purpose of the rules that remain. There is no neutral Internet to preserve.
There is only one that works.
These innovations, in other words, were not created to destroy the principle
of an Open Internet. Rather, each has played a vital role in transforming the
Internet into the faster, cheaper, and better technology platform we are
accustomed to today. The genius of a virtual infrastructure is that it can be
redesigned and rebuilt without any interruption in service. The result, however,
is that that users do not see these changes; consumers, as well as the FCC, fail
to realize that we're now traveling on a multi-lane highway rather than the old
dirt road. The technology is utterly changed, and the rules of the road have
changed with it.
While advocacy groups that hoped for "pure" neutrality were incensed with
these exceptions, particularly the measured approach to mobile broadband
access and the provisional reprieve for specialized services,193 the exceptions
190 Id 9.
19 But see Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 76 n.235.92 Performing a keyword search in the Open Internet Order yielded these results.
193 Sara Jerome, FCC Chairman Told to Put on 'Man Pants', THE HILL (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://commcns.org/rOmlRp; Timothy Karr, Obama FCC Caves on Net Neutrality-




will prevent the new rules from damaging the Internet ecosystem.194 Each one
is essential to the smooth operation of today's Internet. The majority, to its
credit, came to understand that the Internet is far more complex than the simple
slogan of "neutrality" that initiated this rulemaking. And the Internet will
continue to improve, assuming future innovations do not violate the FCC's
rules.
Unfortunately, the final rules, tempered by a list of "these and no more"
exceptions suggest that the majority is still clinging to an idealized past. It
came close to seeing the light, but in the end the majority couldn't accept that
the Internet has evolved successfully, and continues to evolve, without FCC
regulatory oversight. It is impossible to explain the exceptions for
"inconsistent" and non-neutral innovations such as CDNs, specialized services,
peering arrangements, e-readers, game consoles, and app stores any other way.
The FCC learned not only that these component technologies are established in
the network infrastructure, but also that they are the reason the Internet works
so well.
While important developments in "non-neutral" network management are
grandfathered into the rules, the long-term danger of the FCC's new rules will
be disruption to future network management tools and inventions. The
mischief of the rules, then, will not be to today's Internet, but to the unintended
impact they may have on tomorrow's innovations. Many will be presumptively
in violation of the rules-as many on the exceptions list would have been had
they not been granted absolution. Future innovations will require FCC pre-
approval.
If only the majority had taken a step back and recognized the deeper reality
of that long list of exceptions. Allowing them will protect today's ecosystem,
but by naming the exceptions individually the majority has left no room for
many innovative future network management technologies to develop
organically. Better to have acknowledged that the myth of a neutral network
was nothing more, and allow Internet technologies to continue developing
without the burden of regulatory oversight.
V. HIDDEN COSTS: COASE AND THE PROBLEMS OF
ENFORCEMENT ERROR
Beyond a significant risk that the new rules will limit the development of
future infrastructure innovations, there is also the more mundane but
194 Cecilia Kang, FCC Approves Net Neutrality Rule; Criticism is Immediate, WASH.
PosT (Dec. 22, 2010), http://commcns.org/rYlaeG; Niall Firth, U.S. Media Watchdog
Passes Net Neutrality Law That Paves Way for 'Two-Speed' Internet for Mobiles, MAIL
ONLINE (Dec. 23, 2010), http://commcns.org/ujm5Ne.
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immediate problem of financial cost. Though the majority "expect[s] the costs
of compliance with our prophylactic rules to be small," there is little analysis
to support that assertion.' 95 In a section hopefully titled, "The Benefits of
Protecting the Internet's Openness Exceed the Costs," the FCC fails to
calculate the regulations' costs or benefits with any rigor.196 Instead, the
agency simply states that"[b]y comparison to the benefits of these prophylactic
measures, the costs associated with the open Internet rules adopted here are
likely small." 97
The Order infers that undertaking a cost-benefit analysis for the new rules
was unnecessary. 19 Indeed, the only compliance cost the FCC recognizes is
for the new transparency rule, which will require Internet access providers to
disclose network management practices to give consumers the opportunity to
weigh these practices when deciding which broadband provider to choose.199
The only authority cited for these economic conclusions is to comments
filed by Free Press.200 However, Free Press does not employ any economists,
nor did it perform any economic analysis of the rules' benefits or costs.201 In
any case, the rules were not finalized until months after Free Press filed their
comments.202
A. The Nature of Enforcement
Unfortunately, the transparency rule is not the only source of new costs
associated with the Order. Most significantly, the FCC failed to account for its
own costs in enforcing all the new rules, as well as the costs for broadband
Internet access providers to defend any claims that they have violated them.
19 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 4. See also id. T 39 ("In short, rules that
reinforce the openness that has supported the growth of the Internet, and do not substantially
change this highly successful status quo, should not entail significant compliance costs.");
id. J32 n.87.
I Id. $T 38-42.
19 Id 39.
198 The Open Internet Order seems to infer that a traditional cost-benefit analysis-such
as the one that would be performed in a merger-was not appropriate here because
broadband providers were generally in agreement with the open Internet rules. See id. 39,
59 ("[b]roadband providers generally endorse openness norms-including the transparency
and no blocking principles-as beneficial and in line with current and planned business
practices"). But if so, what was the imperative to pass new rules?
'9 Id. 11 39, 43, 53-59.
200 Id. 39 n.124.201 Who We Are, FREE PRESS, http://commens.org/uKex52 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
See generally In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Comments
ofFree Press, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Jan. 14, 2010).
202 In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Comments ofFree
Press, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 at 1 (Jan. 14,2010).
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As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the procedural rules for enforcing
the Order are longer than the substantive rules.203 Three types of actions may
be taken to enforce the rules, and a set of procedures for complaints, discovery,
hearings and appeals incorporate much of the protocols that govern actions and
appeals in federal district courts and in the courts of appeal.204
First, any individual or organization may file an informal complaint through
the FCC website without paying a fee.205 Though such complaints will not
automatically lead to agency action, "the Enforcement Bureau will examine
trends or patterns in complaints to identify potential targets for investigation
and enforcement action." 206 Second, the agency itself may initiate actions,
perhaps based on trends or patterns it notes in the informal complaints.207 The
third avenue for enforcement, the filing of a formal complaint, is the most
worrisome avenue for enforcement. 208 Under the Order, "[a]ny person may file
a formal complaint alleging a violation of the rules. . . ."209
Students of Nobel prize-winning economist Ronald Coase could quickly
identify the uncalculated costs associated with enforcement. For Coase, the
market is not a magic world of perfect efficiency that theoretical economists
assume in their models. In reality, each transaction between a buyer and a
seller has inefficiencies or transaction costs associated with it.210
Of the numerous categories of transaction costs, the one that seems not to
211have penetrated the majority's analysis is the cost of enforcing agreements.
In the event the terms of a transaction are not met to the satisfaction of buyer
or seller or both, various mechanisms-including arbitration, negotiation,
regulators and/or the courts-must be invoked to ensure the bargain made is
the bargain received.
These costs can be exorbitant; indeed, far greater than the value of the
underlying transaction. To take a trivial example, a rational consumer won't
sue the maker of a rubber band that breaks the first time she uses it. The
costs-time, effort, and out-of-pocket expenses for lawyers, filing fees, and the
203 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, app. B §§ 8.12-8.17.




208 Id., app. B § 8.12 (emphasis added). See also id. 154-159.
209 Id., app. B § 8.12.
2lo R.H. Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-397 (1937) (explaining
how transaction costs-the costs incurred when purchasing goods or services from third
parties-play a role in determining a firm's growth). See also Michael I. Swygert and
Katherine Earle Yanes, A Primer on the Coase Theorem: Making Law in a World of Zero
Transaction Costs, DEPAUL Bus. L.J., Fall-Winter 1998, at 20-22.
211 Swygert, supra note 210, at 20-22 (noting that "enforcement of agreements" falls into
the broad category of transaction costs).
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like-so obviously exceed the value of the best possible outcome (replacement
of the broken item) that no one would bother. 212
But what if the consumer can transfer nearly all of the enforcement costs on
someone else, such as the FCC, or their broadband Internet access provider? If
''any person" who believes something is amiss can file a complaint and pay
only a small filing fee to start the machinery of enforcement, why not bring a
complaint for any perceived infraction, no matter how small or illusory?
The Order creates exactly this kind of incentive, allowing consumers to file
formal complaints and pass on nearly all of the enforcement costs to the FCC
or to broadband Internet access providers.213 While the very existence of the
rules may deter some of the prohibited behaviors, it is also likely that the FCC
will be called upon to enforce the rules against broadband access providers
accused of violating them, even when those complaints border on the
frivolous.214 The enforcement costs can be significant-including the costs to
the agency itself and to the companies rightly or wrongly charged with
violations. Given both the intentional vagueness of the final rules and the
generous mechanisms available to make and resolve complaints, the rules as
written are likely to introduce substantial enforcement costs .215 Unfortunately,
the Report fails to mention these costs or their potential impact on the Order's
cost-benefit analysis.
B. The Danger of a Private Right of Action
The ability of any individual to initiate an enforcement proceeding action is
known as a private right of action.216 Federal law grants very few such broadly
212 Why? The loss of value from the broken rubber band is a fraction of a penny. But the
enforcement cost of initiating-let along prosecuting-a lawsuit would exceed that price by
several orders of magnitude. And, in most cases, all the consumer could hope to win would
be the fraction of a cent. The cost of enforcing the implied promise of a working rubber
band-and the seller's cost of defending itself-are lost. They are inefficiencies of the
market, i.e. transaction costs. Even without knowing exactly how much they are, no
consumer would undertake them. See id., at 2-4 (explaining that transaction costs shift the
burden of performing an action from one party to another, causing the parties to expend
additional resources to counterbalance that burden).
213 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 154-157, app. B § 8.12.
214 Before the rules had even taken effect, Free Press had already filed its first complaint.
They claimed that a new low-cost plan from mobile broadband provider MetroPCS, which
forbid video streaming except for YouTube, constituted a violation of the new rules.
MetroPCS responded by filing suit to challenge the rules themselves, one of two premature
complaints filed before the publication of the rules in the Federal Register. See Thomas W.
Hazlett, FCC Net Neutrality Rules and Efficiency, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://commcns.org/sKmENN.
s Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 1I51-160.216 Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1119 (3d ed. 1969).
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written rights, for a simple reason. Giving each of the hundreds of millions of
American consumers the right to initiate a formal proceeding that the
government and the complained-of party must address would generate
enormous costs.
That, however, is precisely what the Open Internet rules allow. Regardless
of the merits or specifics of a complaint alleging a violation of the rules, "the
defendant must submit an answer."217 In cases where the "facts" are disputed,
"a thorough analysis of the challenged conduct might require further factual
development and briefing."218 Moreover, "the broadband provider must answer
each claim with particularity and furnish facts, supported by documentation or
affidavit, demonstrating reasonableness of the challenged practice." 219
In resolving formal complaints, "the Commission will draw on resources
from across the agency-including engineering, economic, and legal experts-
to resolve open Internet complaints in a timely manner."220 Specific "pleading
requirements" laid out in the Order govern the procedures for filing
complaints, answers and replies, conducting discovery, developing and
supporting legal arguments, verifying facts and documents submitted, and
more.221 Moreover, the FCC "may specify other procedures," including
hearings and oral arguments, and "may require the parties to submit any
additional information it deems appropriate for a full, fair, and expeditious
resolution of the proceedings, including copies of all contracts and documents
reflecting arrangements and understandings alleged to violate" the rules. 222
Any person or organization can file a formal complaint so long as they have
a good faith belief that the broadband provider has violated the rules. 223
However, since consumers are unlikely to know with any certainty whether the
behaviors they observe are in fact violations of the rules, any slow-down,
hiccup, temporary outage, or other network artifact that appears to suggest
interference will constitute a good faith belief that a violation has occurred. As
a result, they will be free to file a complaint, burdening others-the provider
for the most part and the FCC to a lesser, but still substantial, degree-with all
the costs, even if no violation of the rules occurred.
217 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 156.
218 Id.219 Id. 157.
220 Id 159.
221 Id, app. B §§ 8.13-8.17 (for example, any broadband provider served with a complaint
must respond within 20 days. Its answer must respond to each fact referenced in the
complaint, supported with documentation including affidavits, legal authority, and other
evidence).
222 Id.
223 Id. 156; 47 C.F.R. § 8.12.
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VI. THE FCC'S AUTHORITY: "BADGES? WE DON'T NEED NO
STINKING BADGES!"224
The uncalculated costs of the rules may or may not become apparent in
practice, however. The new rules may be short-lived, given that the majority
has built its new broadband Internet access regulations on a questionable legal
foundation. This problem is discussed only briefly here, largely because FCC
Commissioner Robert McDowell has thoroughly detailed the legal analysis
already. His dissent calmly and systematically dismantles the majority's
asserted legal authority.225
It also is important to note that this is not a theoretical discussion of
statutory interpretation. Even before the rules were published in the Federal
Register, two broadband providers-Verizon and then MetroPCS-filed
lawsuits in the D.C. Circuit challenging the FCC's authority to regulate.226
Verizon's suit, initially dismissed as premature, has now been refiled, and the
case will be heard in the D.C. Circuit.227 The arguments sketched out in
Commissioner McDowell's dissent are likely to mirror the complainants'
briefs in its Petition.
A. The Need for Authority
Why does authority matter? Put simply, Congress alone has the power to
legislate, and the FCC can only regulate if Congress delegates power to it; any
rulemaking undertaken without statutory authority is considered
unconstitutional.228 Unfortunately for the FCC, Congress has not delegated to
it the authority to regulate broadband Internet access.229 More than the rules
themselves, Verizon and others, including net neutrality-sympathizers like the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, worry that allowing the FCC to pass rules
without authorization will establish a dangerous precedent. 230 Any time in the
224 The Treasure of the Sierra Madre (Warner Brothers 1948). See Tim Dirks, The
Treasure of the Sierra Madre (1948), AMC FILMSITE MOVIE REVIEW (last visited Dec. 15,
2011), http://commcns.org/vlGs8p (the 1974 comedy "Blazing Saddles" actually
popularized this exact phrasing of the dialogue).
5 See generally Open Internet Order, supra note 1, IT 115-150.
226 On Verizon's effort to secure exclusive jurisdiction for the D.C. Circuit, see James
DeLong, Which Court Gets to Hear the Net Neutrality Appeal?, DIGITAL SOCIETY (Jan. 21,
2011), http://commcns.org/uH87fl.
227 Marguerite Reardon, Verizon Sues Again to Block Net Neutrality Rules, CNET NEWS
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://commcns.org/rUI2hG.
Fresno Mobile Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 165 F.3d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
229 Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Chairman Outlines Broadband Framework, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
1, 2010), http://commcns.org/slhV08.
230 See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Net Neutrality: FCC Trojan Horse Redux, EFF
DEEPLINKS BLOG (May 3, 2010), http://commcns.org/voZnlv; Corynne McSherry, Is Net
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future that the FCC wants to extend its power, it need only deputize itself.
This feature of the Order is the one that has most alarmed the
communications industry, members of Congress, and advocates of limited
government. 231 It is the primary reason that Members of Congress attempted to
reverse the ruling, even as Verizon and others challenge it in court.232
B. Regulatory Overreach is Not a New Problem
Regardless of perceived market failures, the agency cannot take action
without explicit regulatory powers delegated by Congress.233 The FCC's
rulemaking and adjudicatory powers are strictly limited by implementing
statutes passed by Congress, notably the Communications Act of 1934 and its
revisions.234 If the FCC does act, the courts are the final determinants of
whether Congress has delegated the necessary powers.235
While the FCC wants to regulate broadband Internet providers to ensure a
"level playing field" and believes regulation is essential to preserve the
Internet, Congress has not given the agency the authority to do so.236 In fact,
members of Congress have introduced several "net neutrality" bills within the
past ten years that would grant rulemaking authority to the FCC; none have
ever been voted out of committee. 237
If anything, the FCC's authority over broadband became even more clouded
in the course of the rulemaking. The NPRM simply assumed the needed power
was there; after all, the rulemaking was largely just a formalization of the
agency's existing Internet Policy Statement:
The Internet Policy Statement has helped preserve the openness of the
Internet over the past four years, but the time has now come to build on past
efforts and to provide greater clarity regarding the Commission's approach to
these issues through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. 238
The policy statements, however, were already under siege. A few months
Neutrality a FCC Trojan Horse?, EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://commcns.org/ugorZO.
3 Net Neutrality, Back in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2011), http://commcns.org/tnOlSa;
Blackburn to Introduce Anti-Net Neutrality Bill, THE HILL (Dec. 5. 2010),
http://commcns.org/vgfYub.
32 Downes, Tech Priorities for New Congress: From Old to New, supra note 29.
233 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706-09, 99 (1979) (holding that rules
relating to cable television were not within the FCC's statutorily defined jurisdiction).
234 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
235 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).236 Declan McCullagh, Court: FCC Has No Power to Regulate Net Neutrality, CNET
NEWS (Apr. 6, 2010), http://commcns.org/toDSRb.
237 Id.
238 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, [ 6.
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after the NPRM was issued, Comcast successfully challenged the FCC's
authority to enforce the policy statement in the D.C. Circuit. The court in
Comcast held that whether Comcast had violated the policy statement or not
did not matter because the policy itself had no legal basis; the FCC could not
regulate broadband Internet access because it lacked statutory authority.239 The
court agreed with Comcast that while the Communications Act gave the
agency broad authority over common carrier services such as telephone
service, Congress had delegated almost no authority over information services
such as broadband Internet access.240
This was no surprise. The Comcast case, as well as several earlier D.C.
Circuit and Supreme Court cases, makes clear that Congress did not delegate
authority over broadband access under Title I of the Communications Act.241
While the FCC argued that Title I included "ancillary jurisdiction" to regulate
information services, the court found the connection between network
management techniques and the agency's statutory authority over telephone
and cable networks too attenuated.242 The Commission's Open Internet policy
was simply not "ancillary" to any regulatory provision in the Communications
Act.
There was nothing new in the logic of the Comcast decision. The FCC is
frequently unsuccessful in efforts to defend its regulations by attaching
otherwise unauthorized rules to its ancillary authority. For example, in 2005
the D.C. Circuit rejected regulations that would have required manufacturers to
include "broadcast flag" technology in any device capable of receiving a
television signal and limit recording of broadcast content based on the contents
of the flag.243 The new regulations were grounded, the agency argued, in the
FCC's ancillary jurisdiction over broadcast television. But while the agency
had unquestioned authority over broadcasters, the court held they could not
require non-broadcasters to comply with rules aimed at helping the
broadcasters control unauthorized home taping.244
239 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).240 Id. at 645. The one exception was Internet access provided by dial-up modems, no
longer a significant source of access. Howard W. Waltzman, Federal Communications
Commission Lacks the Authority to Reclassify Broadband Services as Telecommunications
Services, MAYER BROWN, http://commcns.org/s31FCC (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
241 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644-45; Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-74, 980-81 (2005).
242 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644.
243 Am. Library Ass'n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
244 Id. at 691-92. At oral argument, the judges were highly critical of the FCC. "You're
out there in the whole world, regulating. Are washing machines next?" asked Judge Harry
Edwards. Judge David Sentelle added, "You can't regulate washing machines. You can't rule
the world." See Declan McCullagh, Court Questions FCC's Broadcast Flag Rules, CNET
NEWS (Feb. 22, 2005), http://commcns.org/sN4X79.
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The logic of the Comcast case was much the same. After reviewing and
rejecting over a dozen sections of the Communications Act that the FCC
offered as ancillary to the Internet Policy Statement, the Court vacated the
order against Comcast without any review of the merits. The Commission, the
court concluded, "has failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority over
Comcast's Internet service to any 'statutorily mandated responsibility."'
245
C. The FCC's "Very Smart Lawyers" Try Again .. . and Again
In October, 2009, the NPRM based its authority on a legal theory identical
to the one rejected in the Comcast case a few months later.246 Midway through
the Open Internet proceeding, then, the agency was suddenly left without
authority for its proposed rulemaking. With Congress unlikely to move on any
of the proposed net neutrality authorization bills, and ancillary authority
essentially foreclosed to the agency, Chairman Genachowski was forced to
consider unorthodox alternatives.
One option he considered was to "reclassify" broadband Internet service as a
Title II telecommunications service, subjecting it to the same section of the law
that regulated the former telephone monopoly.247 A wide range of industry and
consumer groups, along with a bi-partisan majority of Congress, strongly
opposed this idea.248 If attempted, this effort would have been subject to
substantial legal challenges and would likely have failed.
Next, the Chairman offered a modified Title II proposal in May 2010, which
he termed the "third way"-neither Title I nor full Title 11.249 Broadband
Internet access would be reclassified as a Title II telecommunications service,
but the Commission would exercise its authority under § 10 of the
Communications Act to forbear from applying a number of unnecessary
provisions.250 Objections to this proposal were equally vocal, however, and the
Chairman backed off again.. 251
245 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 661.
246 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 41, if 83-87.
247 Statement of Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, The Third Way: A Narrowly
Tailored Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010), http://commcns.org/uxdndv.248 See Marguerite Reardon, Lawmakers Oppose FCC Plan to Reassert Net Authority,
CNET NEWS (May 28, 2010), http://commcns.org/vZ41Kh; Cecilia Kang, FCC
Reclassification Would Face Political, Legal Opposition, Analysts Say, WASH. POST (May
4, 2010), http://commcns.org/vdYlhi.
249 Chairman Julius Genachowski, supra note 247. The "third way," strangely, was
grounded in Justice Scalia's solitary dissent in the Brand X case. FCC Statement: 'Third
Wa 'Legal Framework, CNET NEWS (May 6, 2010), http://commcns.org/t0Sws7.
20 Chairman Julius Genachowski, supra note 247.
251 Spencer Dalziel, FCC 'Third Way' Attracts Criticism: ISPs Fear Net Neutrality
Regulation, THE INQUIRER (May 7, 2010), http://commcns.org/rETFYY; Chloe Albanesius,
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After efforts at developing a compromise solution failed over the summer of
2010, in November, Chairman Genachowski announced that the FCC's "very
smart lawyers" had discovered still another legal theory that would save the
rules, this time without any reliance on Title 11.252 That theory appears in the
final Order passed a little more than a month later. But it was largely a rerun of
the arguments rejected in Comcast, albeit with some minor tweaks. 253
The new argument relies on a slightly different reading of Section 706 of the
Communications Act. Section 706 was one of the provisions advanced and
rejected in Comcast as the basis of ancillary jurisdiction.254 In the Order,
however, the FCC offers a new reading of Section 706, arguing that the
provision provides independent, explicit authority over broadband Internet
access providers sufficient to implement the Open Internet rules.255
This is an odd theory at best. On its face, Section 706 does not authorize the
FCC to regulate anything. The goal of Section 706(a) is to encourage the FCC
to promote broadband adoption by "regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment," including forbearance from its existing powers.256
This provision was aimed, in other words, at removing regulations that
hindered the ability of telephone carriers to provide advanced
telecommunications capability.257 Similarly, Section 706(b) requires the FCC
to issue a regular report on broadband deployment and immediately act to
remove investment barriers (such as regulations) if it finds such deployment is
not taking place in a "reasonable and timely fashion." 258
Even if 706(b) authorized new regulations, as Commissioner McDowell
noted, the 706(b) reports consistently found broadband deployment to be
proceeding rapidly.259 That is, however, until a few months after the Comcast
decision. In July 2010, the 706(b) Report for the first time found that
"broadband deployment to all Americans is not reasonable and timely," despite
the fact that broadband availability grew from 15% of Americans in 2003 to
FCC's Clyburn Defends 'Third Way' Plan, PCMAG (June 4, 2010),
http://commcns.org/v2ibq4; W. David Gardner, Net Neutrality Battle Lines Form Over FCC
'Third Way'Plan, INFORMATION WEEK (May 10, 2010), http://commcns.org/vhmfef.
252 Sara Jerome, FCC Chairman Genachowski Knocks Google, Verizon for Slowing Net-
Neutrality Efforts, THE HILL (Nov. 17, 2010), http://commcns.org/vxpc lY.
253 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 115-150 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting)
(McDowell dissents only explaining the weakness of the argument without the need for
much added commentary).
254 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658-59. See Open Internet Order, supra note 1, f 120-122 and
n.380.255 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, TT 117-122 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).256 Id. 117 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
2S7 Id. at 18061 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
258 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009).259 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 18062 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
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95% in 2010. 260 This negative report was clearly a pretext to give the agency
the ability to trigger the "immediate action" language of the 706(b), but even
then, the action the FCC is supposed to take is to deregulate broadband, not
increase regulations. Despite this apparent paradox, the majority now argues
that "Section 706(b) provides express authority for the pro-investment, pro-
competition rules we adopt today." 261
The Section 706 argument is weak to begin with, but the FCC faces another
problem: the agency itself has already rejected the new interpretation. As the
D.C. Circuit noted in Comcast, "[i]n an earlier, still-binding order, the
Commission ruled that section 706 'does not constitute an independent grant of
authority.' Instead, the Commission held, section 706 'directs the Commission
to use the authority granted in other provisions . . . to encourage the
deployment of advanced services."' 262 Section 706 does not grant the FCC any
regulatory authority; rather, it provides only guidance on whether to apply
other statutory provisions of the Communications Act. That has been the
FCC's own understanding of the law, a view courts will give considerable
deference. 263
Can the FCC simply change its mind? While agencies have broad discretion
to overrule earlier decisions, there must be some rational basis or changed
circumstances for doing so.264 Assuming the FCC faces a legal challenge to its
authority to pass the Open Internet rules, a reviewing court will at least look
for external data that justifies a reversal of the agency's prior interpretation of
Section 706. Nothing here appears to meet even that minimal standard. The
only changed circumstance it the agency's lost battle in the Comcast case; that
is no basis to justify this surprising new understanding of a 15 year-old
260 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended
by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Sixth Broadband Deployment Report, 25
F.C.C.R. 9556, 2 (July 16, 2010). See also THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note
139 at 20; Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 18062 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
2J1 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, 123.
262 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658.
263 See, e.g., id. at 659 (asserting that "because the Commission has never questioned, let
alone overruled, that understanding of section 706, and because agencies 'may not . . .
depart from a prior policy sub silentio,' the Commission remains bound by its earlier
conclusion that section 706 grants no regulatory authority"). See Open Internet Order, supra
note 1, 122 (presumably, the FCC understood the D.C. Circuit's statement as an invitation
to explicitly depart from its prior policy as set out in the Comcast decision and, it's possible
to read the Order as doing just that).
264 See, e.g., FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 797 (1978)
(concluding that the Commission ban on new licensing of co-located newspaper-broadcast
combination was a reasonable administrative response to changed circumstances in the
broadcasting industry).
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provision in the FCC's implementing statute. To quote Commissioner
McDowell, "[t]his move is arbitrary and capricious and is not supported by the
evidence in the record or a change of law." 265
The remainder of the section of the Order detailing the FCC's authority
offers a number of provisions of the Communications Act that the FCC did not
offer in Comcast.266 Most are even more disconnected from broadband Internet
than those already rejected. The connection between the Open Internet rules
and the agency's regulatory powers over telephone service, television and
radio broadcasting, cable TV, and spectrum management-all provisions
proposed in the Order-is too tenuous to be convincing to a reviewing court. If
that authority is close enough to support net neutrality, it would be close
enough to support anything, including, for example, the broadcast flag rules
already overturned.
VII. CONCLUSION: PRESERVING WHICH INTERNET, AGAIN?
The majority's effort to find authority for the new rules exposes more than
just the clear intent of Congress not to provide any. It actually undermines the
FCC's legal position and brings into sharp focus the reality behind the
agency's true dilemma. Since Congress last updated the Communications Act
in 1996, a technological revolution has utterly transformed the industries the
FCC regulates. The Internet's packet-switching protocols have quickly and
unexpectedly taken over as the dominant technology for all communications.
Even the "Internet" as we knew it in 1996 looks nothing like the thriving
ecosystem of digital life enjoyed today by so many. In 1996, the
communications, computing and entertainment industries operated in silos with
little overlap. Each had its own established leaders and long histories of
regulatory intervention. Today, however, the worlds of television, radio, and
computing have converged, leaving little left of the world the 1996 Act
authorized the FCC to regulate. These industries have undergone nearly
complete transformation in the intervening years, largely outside the FCC's
authority to intervene; indeed, perhaps in significant part because the agency
was left out of the equation.
The remaining bits of the communications industry still under FCC
control-including Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS), broadcast television,
and radio-have declined. Businesses in these industries-in some cases parts
of companies whose unregulated operations are thriving-are simply unable to
respond quickly to emerging new technologies, applications, and consumer
265 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 18052 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
266 See id. TT 117-123; Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658-59.
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demands because of the regulatory environment in which they operate. They
suffer from a regulatory disease closely related to what Harvard's Clayton
Christensen famously termed the Innovator's Dilemma: they cannot adapt to
new technologies, even if they had the will to do so.267 The slow pace of
regulatory change prevents them from innovating.
Repeated efforts, including the Open Internet Order, to fit square regulations
into round statutory pegs underscore not only the FCC's lack of authority, but
also the agency's unintentional habit of exposing its growing obsolescence. 268
The majority's incantations of obsolete and inapplicable provisions of the old
communications law highlights just how much progress has been made during
the period when the FCC has been unable or unwilling to interfere in the
evolution of the Internet ecosystem.
At best, the new Open Internet rules will have little impact on the evolution
of the Internet ecosystem, either because Congress or the courts will nullify
them or because technology will simply innovate around them. At worst, the
rules will stunt future growth of this now-essential network in unintended and
catastrophic ways. While neither is the result the FCC was hoping for after a
year of genuinely hard labor and thousands of pages of filings and proceedings,
that, unfortunately, is the result they got.
267 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause
Great Firms to Fail 20 (Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
268 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
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